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Abstract 
 
PATRICK R. MILLER: The Emotional Citizen: 
Emotion as a Function of Political Sophistication 
(Under the direction of Pamela Johnston Conover) 
 
Emotion is often stereotyped as a crutch that less informed and less engaged citizens rely 
upon in their political decision-making in place of hard fact and reasoned thought. This 
dissertation reexamines that stereotype, and instead argues that political sophistication is 
positively related to being emotional about politics. Thus, citizens who are more 
politically knowledgeable and engaged should be more emotional about political stimuli. 
Chapter 1 discusses emotion from a psychological perspective, linking theories from that 
field to work in political science. Chapter 2 presents my sophistication theory and tests it 
on individual-level survey data dealing with emotional appraisals of presidential 
candidates. I further test my theory with response paradata from an original web-based 
survey. Chapter 3 discusses the interaction of sophistication and information context. I 
show that high sophisticates are more responsive to emotional appeals in campaign 
advertising, and that emotions are a stronger influence on their voting and attitude 
expression than for low sophisticates. Chapter 4 reconceptualizes information context as 
the emotional cues in traditional news media. I show that high sophisticates are more 
responsive to emotional cueing, and that emotion biases the learning of high sophisticates 
more than that of low sophisticates. Thus, high sophisticates are more emotional about 
politics, more responsive to emotional cues in the world around them, and more prone to 
act on their emotions in their political behavior. 
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 Chapter 1 
 
A Psychological View of Emotion 
 
Emotion and politics are not and never have been strangers. Philosophers from antiquity 
through the Enlightenment traditionally viewed emotion as an undesirable and even 
dangerous impediment to the ability of average citizens to exercise their democratic 
responsibilities and to reason about political affairs (for more thorough discussions see 
Clarke, Hoggett, and Thompson 2006; Marcus 2002; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 
2000). The view that emotion is incompatible with reasoned political thought influenced 
the modern social sciences, and led to the neglect of emotion in the earliest studies of 
mass political behavior in the United States (e.g. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; 
Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960).  
Nevertheless, a major scholarly trend in the last thirty years has been the rebirth 
of emotion as a positive, or at least undeniable, element of democratic citizenship and 
competent decision-making. Political scientists have realized that emotion plays a critical 
role in shaping attitudes and behavior, including candidate evaluations (Abelson et al. 
1982; Ottati, Steenbergen, and Riddle 1992), perceptions of officeholder performance 
(Conover and Feldman 1986), support for public policies (Huddy, Jones, and Chard 
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2001; Huddy et al. 2005; Pagano and Huo 2007), and how the public reacts to campaign 
appeals (Brader 2006). Other work has demonstrated that emotional phenomena are 
essential to well-reasoned decisions and even facilitate learning (Dolan and Holbrook 
2001; Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000). 
Despite these advances, there is still room to expand our understanding of 
emotion in political behavior. While we know a great deal about the effects of emotions 
on a variety of political variables, we know little about how the psyche facilitates 
emotional appraisals of political stimuli. This dissertation has several goals. First, it aims 
to understand how psychological factors, namely political sophistication, promote 
emotional responsiveness to political attitude objects. Second, it explores how 
information context moderates the effect of sophistication on emotional appraisals. 
Lastly, it demonstrates how sophistication moderates the effect of emotion on political 
attitudes and behaviors. Specifically, I argue that high political sophisticates are more 
likely to be emotional about politics than low sophisticates, but that this difference is 
highly contingent upon the emotional cues present in political stimuli. Furthermore, I 
posit that emotion has a more powerful effect on the behavior of more informed and 
engaged citizens than it does on the less sophisticated 
 This work has important implications for how we think about the role of emotion 
in politics. Stereotypes that date back to the ancient philosophers of Greece and Rome 
have engendered a common sentiment in both academic and everyday political discourse 
that emotions are somehow inferior to reasoned and rational thought as a basis for 
political action (Brader 2006; Marcus et al. 2000). This view purports that emotions are 
cheap, relatively effortless cues that uninformed and unengaged citizens rely upon 
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because they are either unable or unwilling to think seriously about political affairs. Thus, 
it is unsophisticated citizens who supposedly vote their hopes or fears rather than 
weighing the issues, or who form opinions about policy questions that are more informed 
by their feelings than any rational assessment of costs and benefits. This work challenges 
that stereotype, demonstrating that it is high sophisticates, those who are normatively 
thought of as being “good” citizens as they are more informed about and engaged with 
the political world (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), who are in reality more emotional 
about politics and more swayed by those emotions in their behavior. 
 
Defining Affective Phenomena 
Social scientists use a number of terms to refer to emotional phenomena, including 
emotion, feeling, mood, and affect. Outside of psychology, scholars tend to use these 
terms interchangeably; however, as work on emotion becomes more nuanced and more 
advanced in both theory and the research tools used, it becomes increasingly important to 
distinguish these terms from one another. There are important differences between these 
four concepts that can have substantial consequences for political psychology research. 
Thus, as other political scientists working on emotion advocate (e.g. Brader 2006; Spezio 
and Adolphs 2007), we should use language that is more precise in our theories and 
define the conceptual boundaries of the phenomena we explore. 
Emotions are commonly defined as mental and physical responses to identifiable 
stimuli deemed consequential for individual or group objectives. They consist of five 
constituent processes: an appraisal that a stimulus has potential consequences for one‟s 
goals, physiological change in preparation for action, changes in cognitive activity that 
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aid adaptation, an action tendency, and the conscious experience of an emotion called a 
“feeling” (e.g. Brader 2006; Damasio 1994; Ekman 1982; Ellsworth 1991; Frijda 1986; 
Lazarus 1991; Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988; Scherer 1994). Emotions are generally 
brief, lasting only a few minutes at most (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Watson 2000). Though 
psychologists bitterly disagree about many aspects of emotion ranging from its basic 
neurobiological structure to similarities in cross-cultural facial expressions of emotion, 
there is consensus over the fundamental question of what an emotion is.  
 This fifth component of emotion is a “feeling,” or the conscious, subjective 
experience of an emotion (Damasio 1994, 1999). Discrete emotions trigger various 
psychological and physiological responses that are characteristic of each particular 
emotion, but these responses are not necessarily sensed or felt in a conscious way. It is 
the awareness of feeling an emotion that we should more properly call a “feeling.” An 
emotion, then, is a much broader experience than a feeling in that the former 
encompasses a wide array of mental and physical reactions whose occurrence need not be 
conscious. A feeling, on the other hand, is fundamentally a conscious event. Feelings are 
also the only emotion component that is unnecessary as emotions often occur outside of 
conscious perception (Hamm, Schupp, and Weike 2003; Scherer 2003). 
 Emotion also differs from mood. Common moods include tenseness, cheerfulness, 
depression, grouchiness, angst, confusion, and contentment. Mood and emotion both 
involve subjective feeling states (Gray and Watson 2007). Thus, one can feel depressed 
(a mood) in general or feel disgust (an emotion) at a certain object, and both subjective 
descriptions would be valid reports. The differences between mood and emotion, 
however, are more extensive. Moods last much longer than emotions, sometimes for days 
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or even weeks (Davidson 1994; Gray and Watson 2001; Watson and Clark 1994). 
Though emotions generally last minutes at most, they can be chronically experienced in 
reaction to a specific stimulus. George W. Bush can make a person angry often and that 
individual can certainly encode the association of anger with Bush in long-term memory 
(Christianson and Engelberg 1999; McGaugh 2003), but she does not feel continuous 
anger for hours or days. Indeed, emotions can occur in such frequent spurts that it seems 
like the emotion is a continuous experience even though it is not. 
 Moods and emotions also differ in frequency (Gray and Watson 2001; Watson 
2000). Moods are experienced more often than emotions, a difference attributable to 
evolutionary biology. Emotions tend to be intense experiences, whereas moods tend to be 
more subdued. The frequent experience of intense emotion can be counterproductive to 
routine functioning (Watson 2000). In contrast, less intense moods are always present 
while humans are awake (Ekman 1994; Watson and Clark 1994), a theory popularly 
labeled “the stream of affect” (Watson 2000). For example, while the full, intense 
experience of anger occurs relatively infrequently, milder negative moods related to 
anger such as annoyance, frustration, or grouchiness are both more frequent and more 
central to everyday, conscious perceptions (Gray and Watson 2007). Even when someone 
believes they feel nothing, that person is actually experiencing a mood called calmness. 
Thus, humans are always in an affective state of some sort. 
 Mood and emotion also differ in their causes and targets (Brader 2006; Davidson 
1994; Gray and Watson 2001). Emotions have specific events or objects that induce the 
reaction process, and the actions that stem from emotions are targeted at the objects that 
caused the emotion in the first place. For example, seeing the plight of people stranded on 
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their roofs after Hurricane Katrina might induce sympathy and elicit actions such as 
volunteering or donating money that are meant to alleviate that suffering. Moods, 
however, need not have identifiable causes (Davidson 1994). Thus, it is psychologically 
valid to say that one “got up on the wrong side of the bed” as a description of a bad mood 
with no additional justification. Further, moods usually do not elicit action tendencies in 
the same way emotions do, even when the cause of a mood is known (Davidson 1994; 
Frijda 1994). Indeed, moods often lead to no action at all.  
 Given how moods permeate our waking lives, one can imagine that they influence 
political behavior. Whereas emotions occur when adaptive action is necessary, moods 
modulate or bias cognition on a more regular basis. Positive moods cause individuals to 
be less critical of attitude objects and to engage in peripheral rather than central 
processing, whereas the opposite is true for negative states (MacKenzie 1998; Mineka 
and Sutton 1992; Teasdale and Fogarty 1979). Mood effects probably do influence 
political cognitions, but to date the application of moods to political phenomena has been 
nonexistent. Rahn (2000) and Stimson (1999) have appropriated the term “mood” to 
describe their respective public opinion theories, but these phenomena are not moods in 
the psychological sense nor do these concepts behave in a manner similar to real moods. 
 Lastly, emotion and affect also differ in important ways. Affect refers to 
conscious evaluative feelings of liking or disliking (Gray and Watson 2007; Parkinson et 
al. 1996; Rozin 2003). Like mood, affect does not always have an identifiable cause. 
Positive affect is any state that individuals seek to reproduce or maintain, whereas 
negative affect is a state to avoid, eliminate, or reduce given the displeasure it causes. 
Many psychologists frame affect in terms of approach and avoidance with positive affect 
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causing approach behavior and negative affect eliciting avoidance (Davidson et al. 1990; 
Schneirla 1959), but affect does not necessarily lead to action as emotion does. 
Affect, unlike mood, has not been ignored in political science. The feeling 
thermometer, often used in surveys like the American National Election Study (NES) to 
assess feelings toward a group or person, is a purely affective measurement item. Feeling 
thermometers are useful for providing global assessments of respondent evaluations 
(Greene 2002; Rahn et al. 1990), though other scholars have correctly pointed out that 
these tools are not useful for measuring emotion because they confound emotions into 
one summary measure (Marcus et al. 2006). Thus, one cannot disentangle the effects of 
contempt or anger from a cold thermometer score of zero. Likewise, it is unclear what a 
“neutral” thermometer score of fifty means. It could represent complete indifference, or it 
could represent perfect ambivalence through a mixture of positive and negative emotions 
that evenly balance. There is no way to test either of these interpretation hypotheses.  
If we are to apply psychology to political problems, then it is important to be 
precise in our terminology. Though many social scientists use the terms emotion, affect, 
and mood interchangeably, there are important differences between these concepts that 
make them distinct in their experience and in their effects on behavior. Though related in 
the sense that they are all called “affective states,” these phenomena are not the same, and 
treating them as such makes our theories at the very least less precise and possibly even 
wrong. Though feelings are not emotions, they are part of the emotional reaction process. 
Thus, using “feeling” in place of “emotion” is more an incomplete description than a 
wrong one. This dissertation focuses solely on emotion. The findings herein do not 
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necessarily apply to mood or affect, and the same can be said of the latter two concepts 
and relating the more limited literature on them to emotion. 
 
The Structure of Emotion 
Though there is consensus in psychology on the definition of emotion, there is less 
agreement on its structure. Certainly different emotions exist, but the debate over 
structure is concerned with how those emotions are related. This debate has implications 
for political psychology as it informs how we should theorize about and measure 
emotion. Political scientists draw on multiple models of structure that are often 
conflicting at the very least or, in some instances, mutually exclusive. Some scholars (e.g. 
Conover and Feldman 1986; Pagano and Huo 2007) prefer discrete models that focus on 
the unique aspects of individual emotions like anger or disgust, and not on how these 
emotions relate. Affective intelligence theory, however, is based upon dimensional 
models that argue that unique emotions like anger and disgust do not exist; instead, those 
names are just different labels humans put on one underlying dimension of emotion 
called aversion to convey its experience (Marcus et al. 2000). For theoretical purists, it is 
impossible to believe in both the discrete and dimensional schools as their basic 
assumptions are mutually exclusive.
1
 Further complicating the debate is hot cognition 
theory (e.g. Lodge and Tabor 2000) which argues that humans cannot remember 
                                                 
1
 Political science has created a misleading debate over the structure of emotion that would baffle many 
psychologists. Our literature normally asks which structural model is “correct,” treating each in isolation as 
if it is the right way to approach emotion. Most psychologists have realized, however, that emotions are 
both distinct yet related in various ways (see Lazarus 1991 for a summary). Psychologists generally treat 
the different structural models as if they are all valid rather than asking which is right, and their questions 
deal more with what those models say about the manifestation of emotion in certain circumstances. Thus, 
anger and disgust can both exist independently, but still be related in some broad dimensional sense. 
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experiencing feelings other than broad positive or negative affect; thus, from this 
perspective, the entire enterprise of studying emotion through surveys is basically futile.  
The point of this discussion is that structural models dictate how scholars must 
measure emotion and the kinds of effects about which they theorize. Thus, we need to 
understand the debate over structure before we study how emotion shapes political 
behavior. At the very least, a better understanding of the various models helps us draw 
connections between works that are based upon competing theories. Neuman et al. (2007) 
identify three major structural schools: discrete (also known as functional or appraisal), 
multidimensional, and valence models. I give a basic overview of each model below, 
focusing mostly on the discrete approach since that is the basis for my work. 
 
Discrete Models 
The discrete school of emotion focuses on individual emotions such as pride and pity, 
their identifiable causes, and their associated action tendencies. By studying emotions 
separately, the discrete school focuses less on how they are related and more on what 
makes each unique. Arnold laid the foundation for appraisal theory through her excitatory 
theory of emotion (1950, 1960), but it has since undergone various modifications. 
Subsequent work has expanded the universe of known emotions, explored the interaction 
of emotion and cognition, and employed modern neuroscience techniques to locate the 
sources of discrete emotions in specific parts of the brain (key studies include: Ellsworth 
1991; Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1966; Lazarus, Averill, and Opton 1970; Ortony, Clore, and 
Collins 1988; Roseman, Antoniou, and Jose 1996; Schachter and Singer 1962; Scherer 
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1979; Weiner 1974). Appraisal is the dominant approach in psychology, though some 
scholars in that field do adopt dimensional perspectives. 
 At its core, appraisal theory is the idea that emotions are affective reactions to 
cognitive interpretations of the world. In its simplest theoretical form it is a theory of 
cognitive primacy, though functional theorists have shown that in the more complex real 
world the relationship between emotion and cognition is nonrecursive in that they 
influence each other in myriad ways (Bower 1981; Isen et al. 1978; Johnson and Tversky 
1983; Ortony, Turner, and Antos 1983; Schwarz and Clore 1983). As Clore et al. (1988, 
p. 4) write, “to say that emotions arise from cognition is to say that they are determined 
by the structure, context, and organization of knowledge representations and the 
processes that operate on them.” Thus, it is our individual understandings and perceptions 
of the world that shapes the emotions we feel in reaction to it.  
 In the discrete perspective, the emotions we feel depend upon several dimensions 
of evaluation. When confronted with a stimulus, individuals arrive at a particular 
emotional reaction by making assessments of desirability, blame, the prospect of an 
outcome‟s occurring, the consequences an action has for their own goals, and the 
magnitude of those consequences. Specific emotions are differentiated based upon where 
they fall on these dimensions. Despite the popular notion that emotions are irrational and 
dangerous passions, functional theory frames emotion in a very rational light. It argues 
that people have emotions because of the perception that some stimulus has consequences 
for their individual or group goals. Emotions focus our attention and direct our actions in 
ways that promote the realization of those goals. Thus, emotions are entirely compatible 
with rational choice theories of goal seeking behavior, not contrary to them.   
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Figure 1.1 illustrates how Ortony et al. (1988) conceptualize the appraisal process. 
Their model assumes that emotions are valenced reactions to three types of stimuli: 
events, agents, and objects. Not all stimuli in these categories will elicit emotional 
reactions, but emotions will occur when individuals find something of consequence in an 
attitude object. The first branch of reactions, those toward events, Ortony et al. label as 
emotions of pleasure or displeasure. Pleasure and displeasure are merely broad labels that 
represent undifferentiated valenced assessments, and not affect. Reactions to agents are 
broadly labeled as approving versus disapproving, whereas those toward objects are 
liking or disliking. All labels in upper case represent structural elements of the Ortony et 
al. model which show how discrete emotions as a group are related. Lower case labels 
represent potential emotional states, mainly discrete emotions. 
Let us examine anger to illustrate the appraisal process. Figure 1.1 shows that 
events can be interpreted in a displeasing way with an undesirable impact on the self. The 
“prospects irrelevant” branch means that the likelihood of an event does not enter into a 
cognitive evaluation as it does with emotions of uncertainty like hope and fear. Anger, 
instead, deals with certain events that have occurred in the present or the past. Likewise, 
some aspect of another agent can be evaluated in a disapproving way, leading to a 
sentiment of reproach or blame toward the “other.”  The blame attribution then elicits an 
anger response. Anger, then, is a compound of negative evaluations of agents and events.  
Appraisal theorists posit that people verbally express feeling those emotions in 
various ways that indicate the intensity of the reaction and other aspects of the 
experience. Ortony et al. call these terms “tokens.” For example, anger is a core emotion, 
but one may choose tokens other than “angry” to label feelings in certain situations. 
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Saying that one is “annoyed” indicates mild anger, “incensed” communicates extreme 
anger, and “steaming” offers more behavior-oriented imagery. Rather than being three 
different emotions, these terms are all anger labeled in various ways.  
 




A necessary component of emotion in the discrete view is an action tendency. 
That is, specific emotions are associated with certain types of actions related to the core 
theme of the emotion. Anger, for example, results from the perception that another actor 
has violated common values or norms. This sense of violation normally leads to behavior 
– the action tendency – that involves punitive acts against the transgressor. Thus, anger is 
basically an attack emotion, with the resulting aggressive actions often aimed at 
preserving the status or moral superiority of an in-group (Roseman 1984; Roseman et al. 
1996). In some circumstances, however, anger can lead to avoidance, so the action 
tendency associated with it is not universal (Berkowitz 2003). Politically, anger has been 
shown to mobilize subordinate social groups to gain recognition through social 
movements or other forms of protest, though their moral challenges often engender anger 
among members of dominant groups who respond with actions meant to preserve the 
status quo (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Nussbaum 2004).  
Though this discussion shows the power and political relevance of anger, there 
are many discrete emotions for which we could tell similar stories. Sympathy elicits 
actions meant to alleviate suffering, for example, whereas pride leads to actions intended 
to praise an in-group in some manner. One can imagine how these action tendencies 
might translate into various political sentiments or actions. Table 1.1 summarizes the core 
relational themes that Lazarus (1991, 2001) uses to define a number of basic discrete 
emotions. This table, though, does not exhaust the list of discrete emotions, nor does it 
cover every possible way various scholars have defined each emotion in their own work.  
As the discussion of anger illustrates, emotions involve both biological and social 
processes. Indeed, psychologists generally advocate a biocultural model of emotion, 
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wherein emotional reactions are a product of both natural and social forces (Levenson 
1994; Mesquita and Ellsworth 2001). All human are biologically capable of experiencing 
the same emotions. All discrete emotions, their general types of causes, the ways in 
which they are expressed physically and mentally, and their action tendencies tend to be 
similar across cultures. Grief, for example, is a reaction to loss for all humans and has a 
certain set of actions and facial expressions that accompany it.  
 
Table 1.1: Core Relational Themes for Discrete Emotions 
Emotion Theme 
Anger A demeaning defense against me and mine 
Anxiety Facing uncertain, existential threat 
Fright An immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical 
Guilt Having transgressed a moral imperative 
Shame Failing to love up to an ego-ideal 
Sadness Having experienced an irrevocable loss 
Envy Wanting what someone else has 
Jealousy Resenting a third party for loss or threat to another‟s affection or favor 
Disgust Taking in or being too close to an indigestible object or idea 
Happiness Making reasonable progress toward the realization of a goal 
Pride Enhancement of ego by taking credit for a valued object or achievement, 
either one‟s own or that of someone or group with whom we identify 
Relief A distressing goal incongruent condition that has changed for the better or 
gone away 
Hope Fearing the worst but yearning for better, and believing a favorable 
outcome is possible 
Love Desiring or participating in affection, usually but not necessarily 
reciprocated 
Gratitude Appreciation for an altruistic gift that provides personal benefit 
Compassion Being moved by another‟s suffering and wanting to help 
 
Culture does condition emotion, however. Social norms, values, and expectations 
train us to react to the world in certain ways. Political culture, for example, shapes how 
we interpret politics in our own countries. Many Americans have Puritanical moral 
expectations for their leaders, as evidenced by the negative emotions the Monica 
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Lewinsky scandal elicited. The French, however, have less saintly expectations that are 
consistent with their political culture. Francois Mitterand‟s mistresses were public figures 
in their own rights, and Nicholas Sarkozy won the presidency despite the fact that he and 
his then-wife both admitted to multiple extramarital affairs. None of these actions 
aroused the outrage among the French that similar actions by an American president 
surely would. Thus, the emotional reactions to the same type of action (philandering) in 
these examples are largely the result of the expectations political culture instills. 
Individual differences also shape emotional reactions. Though people may 
experience the same emotion in reaction to some stimulus, there are disparities in how 
they handle these feelings that stem from personality and their individual goals. Roller 
coasters may cause fear in two people for all the same reasons and both the inward and 
outward experience of that emotion may be the same, but one person may avoid the ride 
as a way of coping with that fear while the other takes the ride because he enjoys thrill-
seeking activities. Some people may not even experience fear in this context at all, 
depending upon individual goals and interests. 
The cognitive processes that constitute emotional reactions also vary by 
individual. Appraisals might occur instantaneously depending upon how familiar a 
person is with the attitude object; indeed, they can happen so quickly that we perform our 
cognitive processing outside of conscious awareness. If an individual is chronically 
exposed to an attitude object that elicits an emotion, that feeling can be stored in memory, 
especially if the emotion is strongly felt (Christianson and Engelberg 1999; McGaugh 
2003). With familiar objects in these instances, mere exposure to the object is sufficient 
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to bring stored feelings from the past into working memory.
2
 Once these remembered 
feelings are activated, they can significantly shape our present thoughts and actions. The 
only “thinking” that occurs in such circumstances is the simple act of recognition. On the 
other hand, cognitive evaluation can be a drawn out, complex process, and emotions may 
arise only after extended, conscious contemplation (Clore 1994; Ellsworth 1994).  
Appraisal theory, as discussed, is based on the idea of cognitive primacy, meaning 
that cognition precedes emotion. Feelings are not possible without some sort of “thought” 
that causes them – an appraisal. The notion of cognitive primacy is counter to the idea of 
affective primacy which posits that emotional responses are often automatic reactions 
elicited in mental processes that occur outside of consciousness (e.g. Forgas 1995; Zajonc 
1980, 1984, 2001). Thus, feeling may not require thinking. Affective primacy does not 
challenge the existence of discrete emotions, just the process that elicit them.  
In a sense, the choice between affective and cognitive primacy is misleading. As 
this debate evolved, it became evident that even the key proponents of the opposing 
views (Lazarus 1982, 1984 for cognitive primacy; Zajonc cited above for affective 
primacy) agree that some sort of mental processing has to happen for emotion to occur. 
The disagreement, though, lies in their respective definitions of “cognition.” For affective 
primacy, cognition must be conscious, whereas cognitive primacy allows it to be either 
conscious or unconscious. Thus, the real debate is over the need to be aware of 
evaluations taking place in the mind that might ultimately lead to emotion. If we imagine 
                                                 
2
  “Mere exposure” is a loaded phrase in psychology. Mere exposure to a novel object is sometimes enough 
to elicit spontaneous cognitive and affective evaluations (Bargh 1997). This is consistent with the process 
of cognitive appraisal outlined here. With an unfamiliar object, the appraisal process that leads from 
cognition into emotion can begin immediately upon exposure, and elicit those emotions almost 
instantaneously. Mere exposure effects, then, can cause assessments of novel objects quickly, but also 
recall evaluations of familiar objects from long term memory.   
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a voter who sees Barack Obama and feels an emotion so quickly that she is not aware of 
the assessments occurring in her own mind, this is precisely the situation where affective 
and cognitive primacy partisans would see the same exact process and call it two 
different things. Indeed, while political science still discuss the merits of both primacy 
theories (e.g. Neuman, Marcus, and MacKuen 2007), psychologists have moved so far 
beyond that debate that breaking down the very distinction between emotion and 
cognition is now one of the hottest trends in their field. 
Defining cognition in a manner consistent with affective or cognitive primacy has 
serious implications for measuring emotion (Redlawsk 2006). Affective primacy rejects 
typical introspective NES questions asking respondents if they have ever felt a certain 
emotion toward a candidate. Emotions occurring outside of conscious awareness still 
have consequences for subsequent cognitive processing (Beck 1976; Corteen and Wood 
1972; Freud 1915; Edwards 1990, Kitayama 1991; Lang 1988; Murphy and Zajonc 1993; 
Zajonc 1994). From the affective primacy perspective, whatever emotional report a 
respondent gives is biased by emotions they do not necessarily know they have. Since 
emotion is largely automatic in this view, any survey answer is likely an error-ridden 
jumble of current feelings unknowingly influenced by unconscious emotion, not a 
genuine report of remembered emotional states. Researchers in this mold prefer less 
obtrusive measures like latency timers to assess whether affect, the remembered 
“residue” of a discrete emotion, has been stored as part of an object schema in long-term 
memory (Cassino and Lodge 2007; Lodge and Tabor 2000, 2005; Redlawsk 2002; 
Redlawsk, Civenttini, and Lau 2007). Theories like hot cognition do not dispute the 
existence of discrete emotions, but they abandon all hope of accurately measuring them.  
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Cognitive primacy, however, has no quarrel with the introspective question 
approach. It recognizes the individual ability to encode the memories of emotional states 
in long-term memory and recall those memories when prompted (Christianson and 
Engelberg 1999; McGaugh 2003). Such items certainly cannot capture unconscious 
emotion and likely underestimate weak or infrequent emotions. Nevertheless, they can 
provide some insight into previous emotional states, particularly the strong and frequent 
emotions that are most likely to influence individual behavior. 
 
Valence Models 
A second school of emotion structure that has influenced political science advocates 
valence models (Neuman et al. 2007). The feeling thermometer and most hot cognition 
research (e.g. Lodge and Tabor 2000) are based upon this model. It posits a single bipolar 
dimension of emotion, with positive/approach anchoring one end and negative/avoidance 
the other. Though valence models are normally described as an emotion model, they are 
theoretically more consistent with affect than emotion since valenced emotional states are 
general, diffuse feelings rather than distinct emotions with unique causes, expressions, 
and action tendencies. Figure 1.2 illustrates the valence model. 
Discrete and valence models have little in common. The one link between them 
stems from the Ortony et al. (1988) model discussed previously. They posit that emotions 
toward familiar, frequently encountered objects may ultimately evolve into a love/hate 
emotional response. For example, individuals may have experienced such a wide array of 
emotions toward Barack Obama for so long that their feelings have transformed into a 
pure liking or disliking sentiment. This is not to say that individuals do not experience 
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discrete emotional states toward him, but it may be that these emotions are so frequently 
felt and accessed from memory that, to the extent that they are related, they have become 
melded into something resembling affect. Thus, whether valence models are actually a 
separate structural model or a subset of appraisal theory is debatable. 
 
Figure 1.2: Valence Model of Emotion 
 








A third school with a significant following in political science conceives of emotion as 
existing in multiple dimensions. Most theories posit two orthogonal dimensions 
(Fabrigar, Visser, and Browne 1997, Larsen and Diener 1992; Plutchik and Conte 1997; 
Remington, Fabrigar, and Visser 2000; Russell 1980), though others hypothesize three 
(e.g. Marcus 2002). Most evidence for the dimensional school comes from factor 
loadings on discrete emotion items asked in surveys like the NES (e.g. Marcus et al. 
2006) and work showing that individuals tend to experience certain emotions together in 












variance that discrete emotions share is more important than anything making those 
emotions unique (Lazarus 1991).  
Scholars disagree about the dimensions that should characterize multidimensional 
models (Marcus et al. 2006; Neuman et al. 2007). The fact that emotion structure is 
dynamic rather than static complicates this debate, causing scholars to talk past one 
another rather than engage in genuine debate over the specific contexts that give rise to a 
particular dimensional structure (Lazarus 1991). The term “circumplex” describes any 
multidimensional emotional space. Researchers have proposed numerous ways to define 
the circumplex, but let us review the few models that have influenced political science. 
 











One popular version of the circumplex posits a valence dimension and a second 









represent the most extreme positive and negative emotions possible, though the meaning 
of the midpoint is ambiguous much like that of the feeling thermometer. In practice, most 
scholars ignore the arousal dimension because of disagreement over its interpretation, 
though most who do address it interpret it as intensity of feeling (Clore and Ortony 2000). 
 
Figure 1.4: Plotted Two-Factor Structure of the Circumplex 
 
 
An alternative model hypothesizes orthogonal positive and negative dimensions 
that vary in intensity (Cacioppo and Berntson 1994, 1999; Cacioppo, Gardner, and 
Berntson 1997, 1999; Watson et al. 1999).  The affective intelligence model is grounded 
in this definition of the circumplex. It posits that the negative dimension, labeled 
“anxiety,” is activated by novelty when unusual or unfamiliar stimuli are encountered 
that merit extra thought or attention and a deviation from routine behavior (Marcus and 
MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000). The positive dimension, called “enthusiasm,” reacts 
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to familiar stimuli that elicit habitual patterns of behavior. Figure 1.4 illustrates this 
variant of the circumplex (Rusting and Larsen 1995). Marcus (2002) has partially revised 
the theory to add a third dimension, aversion, but it has received less scholarly attention.  
In sum, though there is consensus on defining emotion, there is significant 
disagreement over its structure. The goal of the dissertation is not to provide answers to 
the questions that have captivated psychologists for decades, but writing about emotion 
necessitates certain assumptions about the answers to some of these questions. I adopt the 
core definition of an emotion as a psychological and physiological response to the 
evaluation that an attitude objects holds consequences for individual or group goals. In 
the structure debate, my work is grounded in appraisal theory, so I presume that discrete 
emotions exist. This choice necessarily means that I view emotions as based on 
cognition, though, as discussed, that debate is largely one of terminology and does not 
change the basic psychological processes upon which most scholars agree. Lastly, though 
I recognize there are certain deficiencies in introspective emotion questions, I clearly 
believe they have some validity as measures of emotion. No measurement tool is perfect, 
and the weakness of NES questions in assessing unconscious processes is not of such 
overwhelming concern to me that I would opt for a less obtrusive alternative.   
 
This chapter has provided a basic introduction to emotion with an emphasis on how 
psychological theories and debates inform political science research. Chapter 2 proposes 
my theory of how political sophistication promotes emotional responsiveness to political 
stimuli and tests that theory empirically. Chapter 3 offers a quasi-experiment using 
campaign advertising in the 2000 election to introduce the role of information context in 
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moderating the sophistication-emotion relationship, and to show how sophistication 
moderates the effect of emotion on attitudes and voting behavior. Chapter 4 describes a 
web-based randomized experiment I conducted to further test the sophistication-emotion 
relationship and to explore how sophistication moderates the effect of emotion on 
learning. I offer a summary of the empirical results in my conclusion section and discuss 
the broader implications of my research for the study of emotion in political science.
 Chapter 2 
 
Political Sophistication as a Predictor of Emotion 
 
Abstract: This chapter proposes a theory of how political sophistication promotes 
emotional responsiveness to politics, challenging the view that emotion is a function of 
low sophistication. It argues explicitly that high sophisticates are more likely to 
experience emotion in reaction to politics than low sophisticates, then tests this proposal 
empirically. I use pooled 1980-2004 NES data to examine the effect of individual 
sophistication on reported emotions toward presidential candidates. To rule out an 
alternative satisficing hypothesis that might explain my results, I analyze paradata from a 
web-based survey of approximately 390 undergraduates I conducted in the fall of 2008. 
The reported results strongly support the sophistication hypothesis. High sophisticates are 
indeed more likely to feel emotions toward political stimuli than low sophisticates. 
Furthermore, the emotions of high sophisticates are more accessible and certain to them 
than they are to low sophisticates, ruling out the alternative satisficing explanation. 
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Defining Political Sophistication 
“Political sophistication” is a concept that has had many identities. Scholars have 
variously used “political expertise,” “political knowledge,” “cognitive complexity,” 
“political information,” “citizen competence,” and “political literacy” to label the idea 
that some citizens possess a deeper understanding and grasp of politics than others. The 
recent consensus is to define sophistication as individual political knowledge (e.g. Lupia 
1994; Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), the rational being that as more 
learning occurs knowledge becomes more organized and complex (Fiske, Kinder, and 
Larter 1983). Thus, the knowledgeable are more likely to understand and think about 
politics in a nuanced manner. Though scholars have not always agreed on one standard of 
sophistication, the core of all their characterizations is the notion that sophisticated 
citizens are knowledgeable about and engaged with the political system; they understand 
it and have mastery over it, whereas the unsophisticated do not. 
Some scholars suggest, however, that sophistication is merely am umbrella term 
for a concept that should rightly include more than just knowledge of political facts and 
that our sophistication measures should not be limited to one indicator. Proposed 
components include interest, participation, attention, information exposure, the ability to 
link political concepts when reasoning, and the ability to think critically about political 
questions (e.g. Druckman 2003; Fiske et al. 1983; Krosnick 1990; Neuman, 1986; Rahn, 
Aldrich, and Borgida, 1994). I opt for a broad yet reasonably parsimonious definition of 
sophistication that includes some of the traits normally deemed desirable characteristics 
of “good” citizens (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Sophisticates, from my view, should 
possess several qualities that make them more engaged with politics, including greater 
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political interest, attention, and knowledge. Sophistication, then, is best thought of as a 
latent construct, with these traits acting as indicators. Figure 2.1 depicts how I construe 
sophistication, with the circle representing sophistication qualities as a latent quality 
represented by three constituent indicators. 
 
Figure 2.1: Political Sophistication as a Latent Construct 
 
Political Sophistication and Emotion 
Discrete models carry significant implications for our understanding of how political 
stimuli elicit emotion. Appraisal theory suggests that individuals who are more capable of 
making the appraisals that are the first step in the emotional reaction process should be 
more emotionally responsive to stimuli. I argue that high political sophisticates are better 
able to make those appraisals than low sophisticates, thereby making the high 
sophisticate more emotionally responsive to political attitude objects. Thus, empirical 
analyses should reveal that high sophisticates, given their greater knowledge of and 
engagement with the political system, are more likely to experience emotion in reaction 






 The qualities that represent sophistication – attention, interest, and knowledge – 
work together to facilitate engagement and understanding, making those individuals 
possessing more of these attributes more emotional about political objects. Interest and 
attention encourage information exposure (Steenbergen and Lodge 2003), so the high 
sophisticate arguably knows more about politics given those characteristics. As 
information is encountered and processed into long-term memory, it is stored along 
associative networks consisting of nodes that represent concepts and links between nodes 
that represent associations between concepts (Anderson 1983; Collins and Quillian 1969; 
Collins and Loftus 1975; Lau 1989). High sophisticates are more motivated to consume 
political information and, as a result, have more of it, so they have richer associative 
networks than low sophisticates. Greater learning creates more links between nodes in 
long-term memory. These linkages deepen understanding of specific attitude objects and 
help individuals are better engage with new political information (Fiske et al. 1983).  
For example, most people have a node for Barack Obama, but the nodes of high 
sophisticates are likely linked to nodes of more objects than those of low sophisticates. 
Low sophisticates may know that Obama is a Democrat and link him to a Democratic 
Party node, and probably connect him to a few high profile issues. High sophisticates, 
however, can make more of those links, connecting Obama to nodes for more issues and 
other objects than the low sophisticate. Indeed, high sophisticates likely know more about 
specific issues than low sophisticates, so the links between Obama and those issues 
cascade through spreading activation to a wealth of information stored in memory about 
other political objects only indirectly linked to the President (Anderson 1983; Collins and 
Loftus 1975; Collins and Quillian 1969; Steenbergen and Lodge 2003). Thus, as high 
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sophisticates maintain richer associative networks, they understand political objects better 
than low sophisticates and are more capable of connecting disparate political concepts.  
Figure 2.2 depicts two associative networks. The network on top belongs to a low 
sophisticate who knows just a few facts about Obama and health care, and only links the 
two concepts with one piece of information. Maybe this person only knows that Obama is 
a health care reform advocate. The bottom network belongs to a high sophisticate. This 
individual knows more about both Obama and health care independently since both nodes 
have more spokes attached than those for the low sophisticate, and has three pieces of 
information linking the two concepts. The high sophisticate likely links Obama to more 
issues than the low sophisticate as well, but this depiction is limited to just two nodes. 
 
Figure 2.2: Sample Obama Associative Networks 
 
 
When high sophisticates encounter political stimuli, their greater knowledge and 












desires, so the high sophisticate is better able to make emotional appraisals. For example, 
Lyndon Johnson‟s infamous Daisy ad is a classic case of fear in campaign advertising 
(Jamieson 1996). The ad intended to scare voters into thinking that Barry Goldwater 
would be reckless with nuclear weapons, thereby threatening the desire for peace and 
security. The logical action associated with that fear was to vote for Johnson. To grasp 
the full meaning and react appropriately, viewers needed a certain level of understanding. 
Those who paid enough attention to know about Goldwater‟s hawkishness and Johnson‟s 
arms control position and who were interested in Cold War tensions were arguably more 
likely to understand the ad well enough to react with fear. Conversely, unsophisticated 
voters may not have gotten the nuances of the message.  
The same logic applies any political stimulus, including issues, candidates, 
parties, and myriad other objects. Citizens must recognize their interests and understand 
how politics affects those interests in order to have emotional reactions to the political 
world. If individuals do not comprehend what is at stake in an election or policy debate 
because they do not grasp the substance, then they cannot put all the pieces of political 
puzzles together. If people cannot make these connections with politics, they are unlikely 
to react emotionally to its stimuli. This is not to say that low sophisticates are incapable 




H1: Sophistication positively affects the likelihood of experiencing emotions in reaction 
to political stimuli. 
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 Given the discussion above, sophistication should be positively related to emotion 
self-reports in reaction to political stimuli. Thus, high sophisticates will be more likely to 
say they experience an emotion toward a political object than low sophisticates. 
 
H2: Emotions are more accessible to high sophisticates than to low sophisticates. 
 To test H1 more rigorously, I analyze two types of survey paradata – response 
latency and response change – to understand how sophistication affects responses. High 
sophisticates may report more emotion because they take the survey more seriously. They 
might spend more time thinking about responses, making their reports more genuine 
reflections of emotions stored in long-term memory. Low sophisticates might satisfice, 
answering with quick and superficial responses to finish the survey faster (Krosnick and 
Alwin 1987). Saying a fast “no” is easier than searching for memories of emotions, and 
avoids the follow-up frequency of emotion question in the NES. 
 If high sophisticates are more emotional about politics, however, their feelings 
should be more accessible than those of low sophisticates for whom emotion is less 
frequent. Accessibility is measured by latency, the time taken to answer a question. More 
accessible attitudes are retrieved from long-term memory faster than those requiring 
greater effort to remember (Fazio and Williams 1986). Thus, rehearsed opinions are 
reported faster than attitudes that are constructed on the spot or rarely expressed (Fazio, 
Powell, and Herr 1983). Chronic emotions are also more likely to be stored in long-term 
memory, making them more accessible (McGaugh 2003; Robinson and Clore 2002). 
Sophistication should, thus, reduce response time, with high sophisticates having shorter 
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latencies on emotion items than low sophisticates. If sophistication lengthens latency, 
though, this would support the alternative satisficing explanation. 
 
H3: Emotions are more certain to high sophisticates than to low sophisticates. 
 The number of times survey respondents change answers is an indicator of 
uncertainty (Bassili and Fletcher 1991; Heerwegh 2003). Respondents with unstable or 
uncertain attitudes are generally more uncertain of their answer choices, so they tend to 
change their initial responses more often. Emotions should be easier for high 
sophisticates to recall since they experience them more often than low sophisticates. 
Thus, high sophisticates should be more certain of their emotions, and, as a result, change 
their answers fewer times as an indicator of that certainty. Conversely, low sophisticates 
should be more uncertain as they are less likely to have accessible memories of their 
feelings, so they should exhibit more response changes. 
  
Emotion Appraisals of Presidential Candidates 
 
Data 
H1 is tested on pooled 1980-2004 NES data. The NES is the only widely available 
representative national study that regularly incorporates emotional reactions to political 
objects, namely major party presidential candidates. It is a useful starting point for 
analysis because it has substantial variance in respondent education, a variable that is 




 Emotion. Every NES since 1980 has measured emotions toward presidential 
candidates, with anger, fear, hope, and pride being the four consistent items. The 2004 
NES asks, “Has (Bush/Kerry), because of the kind of person he is or because of 
something he has done, ever made you feel (emotion)?” This is a yes/no question, and 
respondents saying “yes” answer a subsequent frequency item indicating how often they 
have felt a particular emotion. For easier presentation, I report analyses on the dummy 
item, but the findings are comparable when the dependent variable is an ordinal measure 
ranging from “no” to “very often.” I also find similar results when the dependent variable 
is a dummy indicating whether the respondent reports at least one emotion. Thus, the 
reported results are robust to changes in the form of the dependent variable. In each NES, 
less than 1% of respondents do not recognize candidates, answer “don‟t know,” or refuse 
to respond, so almost all responses are valid reports. 
Sophistication. Political sophistication is a factor score constructed from interest, 
knowledge, and attention. The NES has used a stable political interest item since 1980. 
Every NES has different knowledge questions about recognition of figures, knowledge of 
political processes, or knowledge of majority parties in Congress. For all respondents 
additive scales are created using all knowledge questions in their respective years. The 
NES has measured general campaign attention since 1996, but previous versions only 
gauged attention to campaign news in specific media. Thus, general attention is used for 
1996-2004, but attention to campaign news on TV and in newspapers are used for 1980-
1992. The original media items are not consistent after 1992, so a single attention 
measure over time is not available. The knowledge, interest, and attention measures fit 
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well empirically. Each indicator loads strongly on a single dimension in principal 
components analysis.
3
 The factor score combines these sophistication indicators into a 
standardized variable comparable across NES versions (M = 0, SD = 1). 
Controls. The NES analysis includes several controls which might influence 
emotions. Demographics include age, race (1 = white, 0 = non-white), sex (1 = female, 0 
= male), education (1 = less than high school, 7 = graduate degree), and the cumulative 
NES income quintile measure (1 = bottom 20%, 5 = top 20%). The standard 7-point 
partisanship scale is recoded as party similarity matching respondent and candidate party 
(1 = strong out-partisan, 7 = strong in-partisan). The standard 7-point ideology scale is 
scaled similarly (1 = strong opposite ideology, 7 = strong same ideology).
4
 Issue distance 
is measured as the average squared deviation between the respondent‟s positions and the 
mean candidate position (Alvarez 1997). Issue items are not consistent across NES 
versions, but the final distance measure is standardized. 
 
Results 
There is substantial variation in how respondents emotionally appraise the 14 candidates 
in the pooled data. The least common emotion in both the aggregated and disaggregated 
data is fear, with only 24.95% of cases reporting that feeling in the pooled analysis. Hope 
is the most common emotion in the pooled data and for most individual candidates as 
                                                 
3
 The factor score is constructed separately for each NES sample in the pooled analysis and then merged 
with the pooled data. Were attention operationalized similarly across years, the factor score could be 
calculated in the pooled data itself. However, the 1980-1992 samples have two attention measures whereas 
later samples have one. The seven Eigenvalues range from 1.944 to 2.26. All factor loadings for the 
constituent indicators are above .72 across the seven samples. 
 
4
Democratic nominees are assumed liberal and Republicans conservative in matching respondent ideology. 
Only emotions toward the major party nominees are included in this analysis. 
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47.6% of cases report it in the aggregate. Anger and pride are more moderately felt with 
36.66% and 38.9% of cases reporting them respectively.   
 
Table 2.1: Emotions toward Presidential Nominees in Pooled NES, 1980-2004 

















































































LR 3415.36*** 2666.25*** 4683.5*** 3992.24*** 
Pseudo-R2 .162 .144 .216 .188 
N 15616 
Note. Entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients; standard errors in 
parentheses; fixed effects were estimated with dummies for individual candidates (not 
shown); cluster corrected standard errors used with cases clustered on the respondent as 
all respondent appear in the model twice; results above are virtually identical when 
missing predictor values are imputed; +p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
 The pooled data strongly support H1 that that sophistication is positively related 
to the experience of emotion toward political objects. Table 2.1 presents logit results for 
discrete emotion dummies. In each model, higher levels of political sophistication make 
respondents more likely to experience emotional reactions to candidates. This 
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relationship is maintained after controlling for political factors that might affect 
emotionality (partisanship, ideology, and issue distance), and the demographic controls. 
Though partisanship has the largest effect on emotions when all variables are 
standardized, sophistication and issue distance are second with roughly similar effects. 
 Figure 2.3 shows predicted probabilities for anger, fear, hope, and pride when 
sophistication is at its mean (0) and ±1/±2 SD. Let us consider those respondents scoring 
above the mean as high sophisticates, and those below as low sophisticates. Though 95% 
confidence intervals are not shown, each of the five plotted points on a curve is 
significantly different from the others. High sophisticates are significantly more likely to 
experience any of the four emotions as each of the curves slopes substantially upwards. 
Low sophisticates, the ones most stereotyped as being emotional about politics, are likely 
to feel none of the four emotions as each of the plotted points below 0 is under the 50% 
probability mark. Thus, low sophisticates are always more likely to be emotionless than 
emotional, at least in candidate appraisals. Indeed, the only respondents with a better than 
even chance of feeling any of the emotions are high sophisticates.  
 These results vividly demonstrate the degree of emotional disengagement among 
low sophisticates, but, more importantly, they also strongly support the sophistication 
hypothesis in H1. Figure 2.3 directly counters the idea that the least informed and 
engaged citizens are most likely to react emotionally in political contexts. Low 
sophisticates on average lack emotion. It is the high sophisticate who is most likely to 
experience emotion in reaction to political stimuli. Indeed, the NES consistently shows 
that as individuals become more engaged, they gain the understanding of politics that is 
the necessary precursor to being emotional about it. 
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Getting Inside the Response Process 
The NES can show a relationship between sophistication and emotion, but it does not 
provide the means to test this association more rigorously. To further test the 
sophistication hypothesis, I conducted an original survey to gather paradata, information 
about the process of answering questions, to understand how sophistication affects 
respondent answers. Two types of paradata, latencies and response changes, are analyzed.  
 
Data 
A web survey of 388 undergraduates at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
was conducted in late November of 2008. Students participated to fulfill a political 
science research requirement.
5
 Participants were 18 to 33 years old (M = 19.35, SD = 
                                                 
5 Age, education, and computer familiarity affect web latency in the broader population (Fricker, Galesic, 
Tourangeau, and Yan 2005; Yan and Tourangeau 2005). Though student samples hold age and education 
relatively constant, I control for academic year as a proxy for the small variance among students on those 
variables. UNC students are required to own a laptop, so computer familiarity is constant. Bias is not a 
major concern as student and population samples perform similarly in emotion research (Zucker and 
Weiner 1993), and the same emotion model used in Table 2.1 gives similar results in the web survey. 
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1.69) with a plurality being first year students (M = 1.97, SD = .98). Most students were 
female (62%) and white (78%; 9% black, 5% Asian, 3% Hispanic), demographics 
reflective of the university population. The sample leaned Democratic (M = 3.62, SD = 
2.03; 7-point scale) and slightly liberal (M = 3.69; SD = 1.65; 7-point scale). See 




 Latency Ratios. Respondents answered four questions about their emotions 
toward the Iraq War: anger at the US, anger at Iraqis, guilt about US actions, and 
sympathy for Iraqis. Responses were timed using a latent timer that measured the time 
respondents took to read and answer each question. Analyzing latencies can be 
problematic, though, because of outliers and their potential influence (Fazio 1990). 
Latency distributions are invariably skewed rightward, with most observations grouped 
near zero and long right tails. The most common outlier remedy is controlling for 
baseline response, or each person‟s average response time on a set of filler items (Fazio 
1990). Baselining minimizes outlier influence, and controls for the natural tendency of 
some people to take longer answering questions. I average latencies on five demographic 
items – religious affiliation, race, academic year, sex, and whether the respondent is 
presently in the military – to construct a baseline response time for each respondent. 
 To place respondents on the same time scale, ratios of emotion latency to the sum 
of the emotion latency plus each respondent‟s baseline, or (emotion/[emotion + 
baseline]), were calculated for each emotion (Fazio 1990). Thus, each respondent has 
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four unique ratios representing their response times. Ratios range from 0 to 1. Scores of 
.5 mean the emotion question time is equivalent to the baseline. Scores below .5 indicate 
emotion latencies faster than the baseline, and scores above .5 indicate slower latencies.
6
  
 Response Changes. The survey program I used, Qualtrics, counts the number of 
button clicks on a webpage. Respondents choosing only one answer score a 2 (one click 
for choosing an answer and another click for hitting submit), so a change count on 
emotion items was constructed by subtracting 2 from the raw data. To deter response 
optimizing (Krosnick 1991), one question was displayed per page and respondents could 
not return to previous items. Similar to the latency baseline, an average response change 
was calculated using the five baseline items to account for tendencies to make errors with 
the web instrument and the propensity to change answers regardless of question type.  
 Controls. Several controls were included for factors that might affect latency. 
There were partisan strength (0 = pure Independent, 3 = strong partisan) and ideological 
strength (0 = moderate, 3 = strong ideologue) variables. Respondents also answered a 
blame attribution item that was transformed into a 3-point blame strength variable (0 = 
Iraqis and US equally to blame; 2 = Iraqis or US entirely to blame). To determine 
whether latency results are specific to emotion questions or apply to survey questions in 
general, respondents evaluated four agree-disagree items about Iraq policy: humanitarian 
aid, infrastructure repair, keeping troops in Iraq, and sending more troops. 
                                                 
6
 Beta regression is normally more appropriate for ratios than OLS, but both yield identical predicted ratios. 
 Table 2.2: Latency Ratios of Emotion and Policy Items 
 Emotion Items Policy Items 




















































































































 .061 .033 .075 .124 .001 .014 .024 .009 
N 368 366 366 364 369 370 369 372 
Note. Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; latencies shorter than 300 ms or longer than 3 SD 






Table 2.2 reports OLS estimates for emotion and policy latency ratios. Sophistication 
reduces response time on all emotions in comparison to respondent baselines, but it does 
the opposite to policy items. Figure 2.4 plots predicted ratios for variables with 
significant sophistication effects. The downward slopes of emotion ratios demonstrate the 
negative effect of sophistication on emotion latencies, in contrast to the positive policy 
slopes. A key aspect of these results is how emotion ratios compare to baseline times. 
High sophisticates answer most emotion items at speeds slightly slower than their 
baselines. Respondents at two SD above the mean, though, respond to anger at the US 
(.495) and sympathy for Iraqis (.48) slightly faster on average than their baselines. 
 

















Anger at US (a)
Guilt about US Actions (b)
Anger at Iraqis (c)






 These results strongly support the argument that sophistication positively affects 
emotional responsiveness to politics. High sophisticates report emotions faster, evidence 
that memories of feelings are more accessible to them because those feelings are 
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experienced more often. Indeed, the latencies of the highest sophisticates indicate that 
emotion questions are simple recall tasks to them. They respond to these inquiries about 
as fast as they answer the simple demographic items in the baseline. Low sophisticates, 
however, are not only less emotional, but take longer to say so. Their emotions are less 
frequent, so any feelings they remember are less accessible. They must work harder to 
search long-term memory, but are more likely to find nothing. This pattern is solid 
evidence against the alternative satisficing explanation. Were low sophisticates 
satisficing, they would not take longer to do it. 
 More importantly, the sophistication sign flips for the policy ratios, evidence that 
its effect is specific to emotion and not more cognition-oriented items or survey questions 
in general. Low sophisticates exhibit faster policy latencies, evidence of either satisficing 
or having fewer considerations to sort when constructing responses (Zaller 1992). High 
sophisticates, though, may weigh more considerations when judging policy options, so 
they take longer to submit answers. These longer latencies indicate that policy questions 
are not recall matters for the sophisticated. If they had rehearsed policy opinions, those 
attitudes would be more accessible and elicit smaller ratios. If satisficing applies 
anywhere, then, it is with low sophisticates and policy attitudes, not their emotions.  
 Table 2.3 presents response change estimates for the same emotion and policy 
items in the latency analysis. I estimate the count models with zero-inflated Poisson and 
zero-inflated negative binomial regression.
7
 Sophistication again affects emotion items 
one way and policy questions another. It reduces uncertainty in emotion questions, but 
                                                 
7
 The two methods produce similar results. Count models assume all observations experience the same time 
period, but my data violate that assumption since respondents differ in response times. To remedy this 
problem, I include an exposure offset, the natural log of individual latency, in the model with a coefficient 
constrained to 1 (Long and Freese 2006). 
42 























































Ideology    




























































































Ideology    



















































LR -193* -304** -303** -389*** -307** -252** 
Pseudo-R
2
 .187 .159 .275 .095 .054 .08 
NBR v. Psn. 8.96** 3.92* .19 .000 46.91*** 19.63*** 
Vuong 3.02* 2.53* 3.65** 2.31* 2.42** 2.12* 
N 371 371 371 371 371 372 
Note. Entries are unstandardized coefficients based on either zero-inflated Poisson or zero-
inflated negative binomial regression; standard errors in parentheses; only models with 
significant sophistication effects are reported, so keeping troops in Iraq and humanitarian 
aid are not shown; +p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .000 
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increases it in policy ones. Thus, highly sophisticated respondents make fewer changes to 
their initial responses when asked about their feelings toward the Iraq War, but the 
opposite is true on policy questions. Sophisticates change their answers more when asked 
about spending on infrastructure repair and sending more troops. High sophisticates are 
likely balancing more considerations than low sophisticates, leading to more unstable 
attitudes, or low sophisticates might be satisficing. 
 



















Anger at US (a)
Guilt about US Actions (b)
Anger at Iraqis (c)





 Figure 2.5 shows predicted changes by sophistication level. Low sophisticates are 
more uncertain about feelings, as seen in the extraordinary degree to which they switch 
emotion answers. High sophisticates change more on policy questions, but their predicted 
changes pale in comparison to those of low sophisticates on emotion items. The big 
picture of the response process, then, is that low sophisticates are more likely to have no 
emotions toward the Iraq War, but they think harder to give more uncertain responses. 
High sophisticates give quick and certain answers that lean toward more emotionality. 
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More importantly, the same is not true of policy questions. These results confidently rule 
out the alternative satisficing hypothesis, and strongly support both H2 and H3 about how 
sophistication affects the question response processes. More importantly, these results 
offer further evidence for the theory that sophistication positively affects the likelihood of 
emotional appraisals of political stimuli (H1). 
 
Discussion 
This chapter directly challenges the old stereotype that emotionality about politics is an 
attribute of the poorly informed and politically disengaged citizen. Low sophisticates, 
those thought to be so distant from or ignorant about politics that they substitute emotion 
for fact and critical thought, are not the citizens who are the most emotional about 
political affairs. In fact, it is high sophisticates, the citizens most valued for their greater 
knowledge, interest, and attention, who are more emotionally engaged with politics. The 
high sophisticate is more likely to experience emotion in reaction to political stimuli, 
whether in the context of candidates or issues like the Iraq War. Indeed, sophistication 
consistently and quite powerfully predicts emotional appraisals in analyses presented 
here, and paradata about the question response process come as close as one possibly can 
in a cross-sectional analysis to demonstrating that this is a causal relationship. 
 This work should not be interpreted as arguing that low sophisticates are 
emotionally unengaged with politics or that emotion has no bearing on their political 
behavior. Some low sophisticates are capable of emotionally appraising political attitude 
objects, and those emotions likely factor into their behaviors and attitudes. However, low 
sophisticates have a poorer understanding of the political world and how it connects to 
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their goals and desires than high sophisticates, meaning that low sophisticates are less 
capable of making the appraisals that elicit emotion in political contexts. Thus, low 
sophisticates just do not understand politics well enough to be very emotional about it, 
and whatever feelings they do have are not that frequent or accessible to them. 
 These findings have considerable implications for our understanding of the role 
emotion plays in politics. Political science now recognizes that emotions powerfully 
affect a variety of political behaviors, and that emotion can normatively be a desirable 
force for the civic competence of the average citizen. What we have failed to understand 
as a field, however, is what role the psyche plays in eliciting or inhibiting emotional 
responsiveness to the political world. This chapter sheds some light on those “black box” 
dynamics of the mind with its finding about political sophistication, and in doing so 
questions fundamental assumptions about emotion that have guided its treatment in both 
scholarly circles and the broader political culture. Emotion depends upon the ability to 
link stimuli to objectives, and acting upon those emotions necessitates the understanding 
and motivation to connect feeling to behavior. It is the high sophisticate who not only 
thinks more about politics, but feels more about it. 
 It is worth reemphasizing that the theory and findings of this article are limited to 
the construct which political scientists call sophistication. To the extent that any 
academic measure of sophistication assesses respondent knowledge, it is general political 
knowledge in which we are interested – recognition of figures and knowing political 
processes or political history. We can all agree that there are objectively true answers to 
the knowledge questions we regularly incorporate in our studies. In reality, however, 
citizens need not have “correct” beliefs or knowledge to be emotional about specific 
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political objects. The infamous “death panels”  that many critics accuse Barack Obama‟s 
health reform plan of including are an example of an incorrect piece of information many 
people believe to be true. Likewise, some citizens falsely believe that weapons of mass 
destruction were found in Iraq, or that Obama is a Muslim or not an American citizen.  
 Some people believe these mistruths, and that false information factors into their 
emotional appraisals. Though we cannot know for sure, furious health care town hall 
participants whose ire is raised over death panels they heard about on talk radio or some 
other media outlet may score as high sophisticates on the measures of sophistication 
political scientists normally use. Such persons may report being very interested in and 
attentive to politics, and may know a great deal of true general political knowledge, but 
our measures do not penalize them for their otherwise incorrect beliefs. Most surveys do 
not include the sort of open-ended questions that would be needed to grade the veracity 
or logic of justifications that respondents may offer for their emotions. Though one may 
criticize the imperfect measures the field uses for assessing knowledge and sophistication 
on the grounds discussed here, this work can only speak to how those concepts as they 
are normally conceived are related to the emotions citizens feel about the political world. 
 
This chapter offers strong support for the core hypothesis advanced in this dissertation – 
the idea that sophistication promotes emotional responsiveness to politics. That finding is 
interesting and important by itself as it undermines the traditional way of thinking about 
emotion in politics. Rather than being a low sophistication trait, emotionality is a product 
of knowledge and engagement with the political world. Still, the question remains as to 
whether this relationship matters for anything other than proving the conventional 
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wisdom wrong. Does it have any consequences for individual attitudes and behavior? 
How does the information surrounding citizens mitigate or exacerbate the differences 
between high and low sophisticates? The next two chapters answer both of these 
questions by exploring the moderating role of information context on the sophistication-
emotion relationship and demonstrating how sophistication moderates the effect of 
emotion on attitudes and behavior. 
 Chapter 3 
 
Introducing Information Context: 
Emotional Appeals in Campaign Advertising 
 
 
Abstract: This chapter introduces information context, the environment surrounding 
citizens and the stimuli in the environment, as a moderator of the relationship between 
sophistication and emotion. I conceptualize context here as presidential campaign 
advertising and the emotional appeals in that advertising. I content analyze ads from the 
2000 election to develop media market-level measures of advertising exposure, then 
merge those data with the 2000 NES to create a quasi-experimental design. My results 
show that high sophisticates are more emotionally responsive to emotional appeals in 
advertising than low sophisticates. Indeed, the lowest sophisticates are largely 
unresponsive to these appeals. I then demonstrate that emotions are a stronger influence 
on the voting and attitude expression of high sophisticates, undermining the traditional 
view that emotions tend to sway the least engaged citizens. Thus, my results show that 
high sophisticates are not only more emotional about politics, but more emotionally 
responsive to political stimuli and more reliant upon emotion in their political behavior.
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The previous chapter presented strong evidence that supports the basic hypothesis that 
political sophistication is positively related to the experience of emotion in political 
contexts. The results demonstrated that high sophisticates are indeed more likely to report 
emotional reactions in response to both presidential candidates and public policies. 
Survey paradata that examine the response process further supported that hypothesis. 
Still, even if high sophisticates are more emotional about politics than low sophisticates, 
what consequence does that greater emotionality have for political behavior? While it is 
interesting to know that the conventional way of stereotyping emotion in politics is likely 
wrong, this fact would be more important were there behavioral consequences to it. 
The next two chapters further test the sophistication hypothesis, but also tease out 
the behavioral consequences of that relationship. They show that high sophisticates are 
not only more emotional about political stimuli, but that emotions have a greater effect on 
their behaviors than for low sophisticate. Specifically, emotion more strongly influences 
policy attitudes, voting behavior, and learning among high sophisticates than among low 
sophisticates. The role of information context is also introduced using both a natural 
experiment involving campaign advertising and a web-based randomized experiment that 
manipulates news about illegal immigration. These chapters show that high sophisticates 
are more emotionally responsive to the political information around them, and that this 
responsiveness disproportionately shapes the behavior of high sophisticates. 
 
Information Context 
The case has been made for a psychological factor – political sophistication – that 
facilitates emotionality in reaction to political stimuli. All citizens, however, inhabit 
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certain political contexts and encounter different political situations to which they react. 
Thus, the internal “black box” dynamics of the psyche and the emotions those dynamics 
produce are influenced by the external environment. After all, emotion is by definition a 
reaction to an identifiable external stimulus, so it is logical to argue that emotion may 
result from the interaction of the environment with individual psychology. 
 Context refers to the environment surrounding individuals: the information 
available, various types of stimuli, and the qualities of those stimuli. Every citizen is 
embedded in an information environment consisting of news, advertising, discussion 
networks, and myriad other sources of political information, though everyone does not 
pay equal attention to their respective environments. Scholars conceptualize context in 
many ways, some broader than others. Some define it in aggregate as the demographics 
of a neighborhood or county (e.g. Campbell 2006; Glaser 1994; Key 1949; Wright 1977) 
or as the content of an actual political campaign (Carsey 2001; Freedman, Franz, and 
Goldstein 2004; Kam 2006), but others portray context as interpersonal discussion 
networks (e.g. Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; 
Mutz 2002). The core of all these conceptualizations is the idea that information varies by 
context and that this information has important consequences for political behavior. 
 Information context varies along several dimensions. First, it encompasses the 
amount of information accessible to citizens. More political information becomes 
available during campaigns, for example, as candidates air ads and make appearances. 
Second, context includes the specific attitude objects to which individuals are exposed – 
politicians, issues, social groups, and so forth. Lastly, context takes in the specific 
qualities of information and attitude objects, including familiarity, contentiousness, 
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source, tone, and other factors. Some issues like abortion are more familiar and divisive 
than others. Similarly, information may be encountered in print venues such as the New 
York Times or in local television newscasts, but these formats vary in ways that may 
affect how information is processed and appraised. 
 Context, then, is a broad term that can be operationalized in many ways. This 
chapter will focus on campaign advertising. Specifically, I operationalize the term by 
matching survey respondents with measures of actual advertising in the media markets in 
which they live. Chapter 4, however, conceptualizes context as the conventional news 
media, meaning television and print outlets. Both chapters show similar behavioral 
patterns, so the findings presented herein are robust to how one conceptualizes 
information context. Whether context means advertising or news, these chapters 
demonstrate that it is the high sophisticate who is more emotionally responsive to 
information stimuli and whose behavior is shaped more by that emotion. 
 
Campaign Advertising as Information Context 
Campaign advertising has been a fashionable research topic for political scientists of late. 
Ads are flashy and sexy. The media often tell us that these ads are among the most 
decisive factors in electoral outcomes (West 2001). Many of the landmark ads in past 
decades such as Lyndon Johnson‟s Daisy ad from 1964, the Willie Horton and Revolving 
Door ads from 1988, or the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth spots from 2004 are depicted 
as pivotal elements in the narratives of recent presidential elections. Though most 
scholars are hard pressed to find large direct effects of advertising on most important 
political variables such as turnout and trust in government (see Lau and Pomper 2004 for 
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a more thorough review), we seem incapable of shaking the notion that ads somehow 
matter given their pervasiveness and their prominent place in political commentary. 
 Advertising, however, serves an important role in educating the electorate about 
its choices and, under certain circumstances, can be effective in shaping perceptions of 
candidates and the electoral process. Campaigns in general educate the electorate and 
activate latent political predispositions such as partisanship and ideology (Alvarez 1997; 
Gelman and King 1993; Popkin 1991; Simon 2002). Many scholars have identified 
advertising as a vehicle through which candidates educate voters about party affiliation 
and issue positions, and familiarize them with candidate biography and personality 
(Brians and Wattenberg 1996; Franz, Freedman, Goldstein, and Ridout 2008; Hitchon 
and Chang 1995; Just, Crigler, and Wallach 1990; Patterson and McClure 1976; Zhao 
and Chaffee 1995). Indeed, Franz et al. (2008) call ads “informational multivitamins” that 
provide needed information supplements for voters lacking in political information.  
 Thus, advertising is an important part of the information context surrounding 
voters during an election. All ads are not created equal, however. Many studies show that 
the affective tone of advertising, meaning its positive or negative slant, is an important 
moderator of how messages shape political behavior (e.g. Ansolabehere and Iyengar 
2005; Franz et al. 2008; Geer 2006; Lau and Pomper 2004; Lau and Rovner 2009; Lau, 
Sigelman, and Rovner 2007; Stevens 2009). Negative ads are generally more memorable 
and persuasive, a logical finding given prospect theory which demonstrates the survival 
tendency of humans to weight negative information more strongly than positive 
information (Jervis 1992; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; McDermott 1998). However, 
there is substantial disagreement over how negative advertising affects voter turnout, 
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perceptions of campaign quality, and attitudes toward government. Some studies show 
positive effects on these variables whereas others show negative effects or no effect 
whatsoever (see Lau and Rovner 2007 and Stevens 2009 for reviews). 
However, as discussed in Chapter 1, affect and emotion are not the same. Affect 
often lacks cause and consequence, so it may not necessarily translate into political action 
when communicated through advertising. Emotion, however, must have a specific cause 
that is recognized at some conscious level, and every emotion is linked to an action 
tendency. Thus, if emotion is elicited through advertising, the likelihood that it leads to a 
political action is greater than if an ad only conjures affect. If one is interested in the 
broad tone of advertising, then the affective approach may be appropriate; however, if 
emotion is the subject of inquiry, then this approach is insufficient. A fear ad may be 
negative in the same sense that an ad with an anger appeal is negative as both convey 
undesirable information. Analyzing both as just “negative ads,” however, ignores the 
specific qualities of information that elicit fear rather than anger, and discounts the 
possibility that these two “negative emotions” may differ in action tendencies. 
 For all the work devoted to affect, remarkably little empirical attention is given to 
emotion in campaign ads.
8
 Brader (2006) shows differing effects of enthusiasm and 
anxiety advertisements, but his affective intelligence approach does not distinguish 
between different positive or negative emotions with its basis in dimensional models. He 
does content analyze presidential ads from 2000 for discrete emotional appeals, and other 
scholars have done similar descriptive work on what emotions are used in campaign 
                                                 
8
 I emphasize “empirical” as many scholars who discuss advertising often mention the role of emotional 
ads in campaigns (e.g. Jamieson 1996; Kern 1989; Nesbit 1988; Perloff and Kinsey 1992; Richardson 
2003). They often decry emotional advertising, though they generally assert its effectiveness and pivotal 
nature in elections. For my purposes, I distinguish between this type of scholarship and studies which 
employ quantitative analysis to study emotional appeals in election advertising. The latter are rare. 
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advertising (Kaid and Johnston 1991; Kern 1989; Marmor-Lavie and Weimann 2005). 
However, there has been no empirical attempt to examine advertising effects using a 
discrete framework that allows for different types of positive and negative emotional 
appeals to have differential effects. This chapter does exactly that. 
 
Sophistication and the Behavioral Consequences of Emotion 
Emotions are critical to politics because they guide behavior in ways that promote the 
realization of goals. Emotions are multi-faceted, with one part of the emotional reaction 
process being an action tendency that motivates behavior in ways relevant to the core 
theme of each emotion. In political contexts, for example, emotions shape learning in 
different ways. Fear and anxiety focus attention on threatening stimuli that produce 
uncertainty (e.g. Eysenck 1992; LeDoux 1996), eliciting information seeking behavior in 
the context of candidate evaluations to reduce that uncertainty (Marcus and MacKuen 
1993; Marcus et al. 2000). On the other hand, Valentino et al. (2008) show that anger 
depresses learning in political situations. Anger is an emotion that results from certainty, 
and they argue that situations about which people are certain do not require learning.  
Emotions affect a variety of political behaviors, from learning to voting (e.g. 
Goren 1997) and opinion formation (e.g. Conover and Feldman 1986), but there is a long 
tradition of normative concern about the role that emotion plays in human behavior, 
particularly among the unsophisticated. Philosophers of the ancient (e.g. Aristotle 1954; 
Plato 1974) and Enlightenment (e.g. Hobbes 1968; Hume 1739) eras believed emotion to 
be detrimental to reasoned, rational behavior. Aristotle, for example, wrote in Rhetoric 
(1954) of how leaders could use emotional appeals to persuade and manipulate the 
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masses. The same stereotype of emotion as an irrational force driving an uneducated and 
unthinking mass has influenced modern social science, with many political scientists 
characterizing emotional phenomena as low information heuristics that often substitute 
for factual information in decision-making and attitude formation (Brady and Sniderman 
1985; Carmines and Kuklinski 1990; Graber 2001; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989; 
Marcus, Neuman, MacKuen, and Sullivan 1996; Redlawsk and Lau 2003; Sears and 
Citrin 1982; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; also Arkes 1993; Kaid 1991; Le Bon 
1952). Brader (2006) also documents many instances of popular commentators voicing 
this same concern about emotional appeals in campaign ads. 
The question of whom emotion influences in political contexts, however, is 
largely unexplored. No empirical evidence validates the stereotype that emotion is a 
stronger influence on the unsophisticated, or that sophisticated citizens can better reign in 
their emotions and act upon reason. Indeed, the sole empirical investigation of how 
sophistication and emotion interact shows exactly the opposite. Brader (2006)
9
 finds that 
enthusiasm and anxiety appeals in campaign ads are more influential on the behavior of 
high sophisticates. They are more likely to participate in political activities and vote in 
ways consistent with their emotions when exposed to emotional ads. In contrast, he finds 
that low sophisticates relatively unmoved by emotional appeals. Indeed, they demonstrate 
a slight tendency to withdraw from political action as a consequence of being emotional 
about candidates at the same time as high sophisticates are mobilized to action. Thus, 
even though high sophisticates are generally better at resisting persuasion (Zaller 1992), 
                                                 
9
 Brader (2006) cites Sniderman et al. (1991) as arguing that high sophisticates rely less on emotion. That 
work is on the “likeability heuristic,” the tendency to make judgments based upon liking or disliking some 
“other.” The likeability heuristic, however, is not emotion, as Brader characterizes it. It represents affect. 
Thus, Sniderman et al. suggest that affect is a low information decision making tool, but not emotion.  
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they are the ones whom emotion most moves, and not the unsophisticated, distant-from-
politics “unreachables” with little political information (Converse 1962, 1964, 1990). 
I posit that emotion, in fact, affects the behavior of high sophisticates more than 
that of the less sophisticated. If high sophisticates are more likely to emotionally appraise 
political stimuli because they understand politics better, they may also better understand 
how to translate emotion into political action. In a policy debate, for example, high and 
low sophisticates may both feel anger, but high sophisticates may better understand 
which policy options best assuage that anger. Angry low sophisticate may not have 
enough information about policy options or even understand the information they do have 
well enough to realize that a particular course of action would shape policy in a fashion 
they might find desirable. Thus, they may be less able to act upon their feelings. 
High sophisticates may also be more motivated to act upon their emotions given 
their more intense interest in politics. Brader (2006) terms this the “relevancy 
hypothesis.” The power of emotion may be more compelling to someone who is 
genuinely interested in the situation that elicited that emotion in the first place. Thus, the 
high and low sophisticate may both feel fear in response to a campaign ad, for example, 
but the high sophisticate may find that fear a more motivating factor in voting decisions 
than the low sophisticate who may care less about the content of that message. Emotions 
motivate certain actions, but that motivation may be amplified when the person 
experiencing that emotion is naturally more engaged with the situation. In political 
contexts, then, high sophisticates may be both more emotional and better able to connect 





H1: Sophistication positively affects the likelihood of experiencing emotions in reaction 
to presidential candidates. 
 This chapter deals solely with the 2000 presidential election between Republican 
George W. Bush and Democrat Al Gore. As in the previous chapter, I first demonstrate 
that high sophisticates are more likely to experience the four NES emotions – anger, fear, 
hope, and pride – in reaction to both presidential nominees than low sophisticates. 
 
H2: High sophisticates will be more emotionally responsive to information context than 
low sophisticates. Specifically, as the amount of campaign advertising targeting a 
particular discrete emotion in relation to certain candidates increases, high sophisticates 
will be more likely to experience that emotion in response to the candidate in question.  
 In this chapter, I conceptualize information context as campaign advertising. Ads 
possess many qualities, but I deal specifically with the discrete emotional appeals in 
presidential ads and the volume of that advertising. I measure volume in gross rating 
points (GRP), a measure of audience penetration that is standardized across markets.  
 High sophisticates are not only more knowledgeable about politics, but also more 
interested in and more attentive to it. They intentionally consume more political 
information than low sophisticates, and are more likely to experience and remember 
passive exposure (Neuman 1986). Thus, all things being equal, high sophisticates are 
more likely to pay attention to campaign ads during an election. Let us imagine a context 
with no external information whatsoever. In this case, there is no campaign advertising to 
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cue emotions among viewers. Absent any stimulus, high sophisticates in this environment 
should be more emotional about stimuli such as candidates than low sophisticates.  
 As more information is injected into the environment, high and low sophisticates 
will not respond equally to this new information. For my purposes, as the GRP of a 
particular emotional theme increases in a market, high sophisticates in that market will be 
more attentive to that advertising than low sophisticates also living there. Given their 
greater understanding of politics and ability to translate that understanding into emotional 
appraisals, high sophisticates will be more likely to experience the emotion advertising 
targets as the GRP of advertising with that emotional theme increases.  
 Take proud in Gore as an example. Everything being equal, the least proud voter 
should be a low sophisticate living in a market with zero advertising that makes a pride 
appeal on behalf of Gore. The voter most likely to feel proud of Gore would be a high 
sophisticate living in a market with the maximum GRP of pride appeals aired during the 
campaign. Thus, we should observe significant interactions of sophistication and GRP. 
Given my discrete framework, advertising targeting a specific candidate should predict 
emotion toward that candidate and not others. Fear appeals about Bush, for example, 
should increase the likelihood of being afraid of Bush, but not how one feels about Gore. 
 
H3: Emotion will influence the political behavior of high sophisticate more than that of 
low sophisticates. 
 As discussed earlier, emotions bias human toward certain action tendencies. I 
posit that in political contexts, high sophisticates will be more influenced by their 
emotions than low sophisticates given their greater understanding of political affairs, and 
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their greater motivation to act upon their political emotions. The goal of campaign 
advertising is to sway voters. Thus, to the extent that emotional appeals shape vote 
choice, they should be more influential in the voting calculus of high sophisticates. The 
logical courses of action in voting are simpler and clearer than in policy decisions, so 
understanding how to translate emotion into action is likely not an issue. Rather, high 
sophisticates may weigh emotional appeals and their own emotional experiences more 
heavily because of their greater general interest in politics, so emotion should influence 
their decisions more than those of low sophisticates. Thus, we should observe a 
significant interaction of sophistication and emotion. 
 
Gross Rating Points 
I use advertising data from the Wisconsin Advertising Project at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. It uses TNS Media Intelligence/Campaign Media Analysis Group 
(CMAG) to electronically track campaign ads aired in different media markets (see Franz 
et al. 2008 for a thorough discussion of CMAG methodology). For the 2000 election, 
CMAG tracked advertising in the 75 most populous media markets in the country, 
covering roughly 80% of Americans. The full list of markets is available in Appendix B. 
Gaps do exist in these data as some markets such as Tallahassee and Gainesville which 
cover highly contested swing states are omitted even though thousands of ads aired there 
(Shaw2006), but many less heavily contested and even uncontested markets are also 
absent. NES respondents not living in covered markets are dropped from analyses here, 
though their omission introduces little to no bias into the analysis (see footnote 17). 
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 CMAG documents every time an ad in a tracked market plays, plus information 
about time of day, its length, its estimated cost, and the cost-per-point (CPP) of 
purchasing one GRP in the market. The end product for 2000 is a data set containing 
more than one million unique airings. The NES does not assess emotional reactions to 
down-ballot candidates, so I discard all non-presidential advertising. This reduces the 
data to 302,269 unique airings representing 305 different commercials. I then sorted 
airings by market and calculated GRP per spot. GRPs measure market penetration and 
account for differing viewership rates and advertising costs across markets. Media buyers 
purchase air time for commercials by GRP, not the total number of airings. GRP are 
interpreted in blocs of 100. If a media buy for one commercial equals 100 GRP, this 
means that the average television viewer in that market saw the ad one time. 
GRP are calculated as GRP = (media cost/CPP) X (time multiplier). Nielsen, the 
main source of media ratings information, divides the day into eight “dayparts”: early 
morning (1 AM to 9 AM), daytime (9 AM to 4 PM), early fringe (4 PM to 6 PM), early 
news (6 PM to 7 PM), prime access (7 PM to 8 PM), primetime (8 PM to 11 PM), late 
news, (11 PM to 11:30 PM), and late fringe (11:30 PM to 1 AM). CPP varies by daypart 
both within markets as viewership rates vary and across markets due to audience size and 
viewing habits. For example, one GRP during early morning costs $79 in the 
Albuquerque market, but $907 in New York City. Thus, the same $900 will expose 
typical viewers to an ad once in New York, but about nine times in New Mexico. The 
quotient of (media cost/CPP) is then multiplied by a time multiplier to account for ad 
length. Thirty-second ads have a multiplier of 1, a value which varies by ad length (10 
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sec. = .5, 15 sec. = .7, 60 sec. = 2). Thus, the GRP of each airing in the data set is 
calculated and used to construct cumulative GRP measures. 
GRPs measure the true penetration of advertising and are comparable across 
markets, whereas other common advertising proxies such as spending and ad counts are 
misleading. The variability of CPP within and across markets makes cost meaningless in 
terms of volume and viewership. Likewise, simply counting the number of airings 
ignores the penetration aspect of advertising. One ad in a large market does not reach the 
same audience as an ad in a smaller market. Whereas GRP are standardized and 
comparable between any two markets, using cost or count biases estimates by as much as 
35% when randomly comparing any two markets.
10
 As CMAG provides an actual 
accounting of ads, GRP is the ideal way to measure advertising as it represents the actual 
ad buy rather than being a proxy and provides a standardized, interpretable measure. 
Figure 3.1 plots the total GRP of advertising by market purchased by all 
presidential campaigns over the course of the 2000 election from the first nomination 
contests in January through Election Day in November.
11
 Only one market, San Antonio, 
experienced zero advertising the entire year. Less than 100 GRP were purchased in eight 
other markets, including some of the most populous (Houston and Dallas). At the high 
end are markets in hotly contested swing states. The campaigns bought the most GRP in 
Des Moines, though it is followed closely by several markets in states that did not feature 
a highly contested nomination campaign as Iowa did. Thus, there is dramatic “natural” 
                                                 
10
 I randomly selected ten market dyads to compare how GRP ratios fare against ratios of ad cost and ad 
count between those same markets, so these are my original calculations. 
 
11
 GRP measures in this chapter are all highly skewed. I do not use any transformation to normalize their 
distributions since the actual GRP value itself has substantive meaning and is standardized across markets. 
Transforming those distributions would lose both that meaning and their comparability. 
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variation in advertising across markets over the course of the campaign. By matching 
market-level advertising measures to the counties in which NES respondents live,
12
 this 
study provides an excellent quasi-experiment that connects the actual advertising context 
surrounding respondents to their emotional appraisals of the candidates. 
 
 












Content Analysis of Campaign Advertising 
To link the emotional content of advertising to the appraisals of NES respondents, I need 
measures of emotional appeals in the ads. CMAG ads are not coded for emotion, only 
affective tone (positive, negative, mixed contrast). Thus, I need selection criteria to 
determine which ads to code and a coding scheme to measure those appeals myself.  
Rather than winnowing down the 305 unique presidential ads aired in 2000 to a 
smaller subset, I keep all of those ads in my content analysis and GRP calculations. This 
includes all ads aired by Bush and Gore, failed primary candidates, the DNC and RNC, 
                                                 
12
 All but two counties in the nation are located entirely within one media market. No NES respondents live 
in either of those two split counties, so there is no error in matching respondents to markets. 
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interest groups, and third-party candidates over the course of the calendar year starting 
with the first nomination contests in January. Limiting the analysis to ads by only certain 
candidates during a certain time period (e.g. Bush and Gore ads during the general 
election) may eliminate advertising that actually affects emotional appraisals. The on-line 
model (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989; McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh 1990) suggests that 
attitudes are the product of information processed in the past and incorporated into a 
summary running tally. Thus, how a voter feels about a candidate in November may be 
the integrated sum of all information received and processed over the course of the 
campaign. The details may be forgotten, but even information encountered early in the 
primaries may factor into emotional appraisals at the end of the campaign. Also, the NES 
asks if respondents have ever felt a certain emotion about a candidate, not whether that 
emotion is current or the product of recently encountered information. Memories of 
emotions, then, are valid reports give the question wording.
13
 
CMAG records ad scripts and several screen shots, and compiles these into 
“storyboards.” My coding is confined to the scripts. Advertising relies on multiple cues, 
including music, tone of voice, and visuals, to evoke emotions among viewers (Brader 
2006; West 2001). Auditory components of the 305 ads are unavailable in the storyboards 
and most of the visuals are missing. There is also no readily available archive to obtain 
the full videos of the commercials. Thus, I cannot code for all audiovisual elements. 
Coding the limited screenshots would provide some sense of the visual cues viewers saw, 
                                                 
13
 I do not factor timing of ads into my analysis. With my aggregate measures, ads aired the day of a 
respondent interview count the same as ads from months prior. From an online perspective information 
encountered long before the interview date is integrated into current appraisals. Thus, I am not concerned 
about decay effects. I do, however, tailor the GRP measures to the date of the individual respondent 
interview as the emotion measures are in the pre-election wave. If a respondent is interviewed on October 
15, then, the GRP measures matched to that respondent only include ads aired in her market up to that date. 
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but it would be an incomplete and perhaps biased picture of the full ad. Even if 
audiovisual elements were available, in all likelihood they would simply reinforce the 
emotional appeals already present in the ad scripts. Pictures and sound are critical to 
evoking emotion and it is a limitation of my study that I cannot capture them as part of 
the information context, but coding those elements would in reality provide very little 
new information about what emotional appeals were made in the ads.  
My coding focuses on two questions. First, which candidate is the target of an 
appeal? The scripts are generally clear about what candidate is the focus of an appeal, and 
tend to name candidates specifically. Vague references such as “my opponent,” “other 
candidates,” or “the other guy” are actually rare in the storyboards. When they do appear, 
I use ad dates to determine the identity of the “other” candidate. Vague mentions in Gore 
primary ads are assumed to mean Bill Bradley, and vice verse for such references in 
Bradley ads. The same logic applies to Bush and John McCain in the Republican 
primary. Vague identifiers in Bush and Gore general election ads presumably refer to 
each other. No minor candidate ads in the Republican primary make vague references, 
and only one third party ad in the general election does so.
14
 The NES only assesses 
emotions toward Bush and Gore, so my presentation is limited to those candidates. 
However, I coded for appeals directed at all primary and general election candidates.
15
 
Second, what emotion is an appeal trying to evoke? I coded appeals for various 
emotions common in the discrete tradition: anger, contempt, disgust, disappointment, 
excitement, fear, gratitude, hope, pride, resentment, shame, and sympathy. I excluded 
                                                 
14
 A Nader ad that aired very few times vaguely mentions other candidates whom I code as Bush and Gore. 
 
15
 These include Democrat Bill Bradley and Republicans John McCain, Gary Bauer, Alan Keyes, and Steve 
Forbes. Also included are third-party candidates Pat Buchanan, Ralph Nader, and Harry Browne 
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emotions not relevant for campaign advertising (e.g. guilt is a reaction to the self, so one 
cannot feel “guilty toward” a candidate). The NES only assesses anger, fear, hope, and 
pride toward the nominees, so I limit analyses to GRP measures of appeals using those 
emotions. Given my discrete framework I am mainly interested in whether appeals to a 
particular emotion elicit that feeling in voters. For example, the ability of anger directed 
at Gore to make voters angry at him is of more theoretical concern than whether other 
emotions also provoke that anger. At any rate, these four emotions account for over 90% 
of all emotional appeals in the 305 ads, a pattern Brader (2006) approximates in his 
content analysis, so excluding other emotions leaves out few appeals. 
Table 3.1 defines the four emotions used in this analysis and provides examples of 
storyboard statements that appeal to them. The unit of analysis is the ad itself. Thus, I 
coded for the presence of an emotional appeal in the ad rather than breaking it into 
smaller statements. When a script included an emotional appeal toward a certain 
candidate, it received a score of 1 for the combination of that emotion and candidate. All 
non-present appeals were coded 0. An ad whose only appeal is hope directed at Bush, 
then, would receive a score of 1 for “Bush hope,” but a 0 in all other categories. 
Appendix C shows the coding instrument. Ads often appeal to multiple emotions. 
Contrast ads, for example, offer negative messages about one candidate, but positive 
messages about another. Thus, I did not limit the number of emotions to which an ad 
could appeal. Only 60 storyboards (19.7%) appeal to just one emotion, so most make 
multiple appeals. I did not allow an ad to lack emotion. Each storyboard was coded for at 
least one emotional appeal, and almost all could be easily classified in one category.  
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Table 3.1: Definitions of Coded Emotions 
Emotion Definition Example 
Anger Response to an offensive or 
undesirable action in the 
present or past that violates 
social norms or values 
Bush Anger (OA = .894; Pi = .834): 
“When George W. Bush first ran [for governor] 
he promised not to cut our retirement fund. Then, 
he went and raided it because he wanted to pay 
for other things.” 
 
Gore Anger (OA = .903; Pi = .874): 
“Under Clinton/Gore, prescription drug prices 
have skyrocketed and nothing has been done.” 
Fear Response to uncertainty 
about the future status of 
some object an individual 
values 
Bush Fear (OA = .956; Pi = .932): 
“Studies show that Bush‟s plan would lead to 
benefit cuts and increase in the retirement age or 
both.” 
 
Gore Fear (OA = .958; Pi = .941): 
“Think what Justice Hillary Clinton or Charlie 
Schumer would do to your gun rights. When Al 
Gore‟s Supreme Court agrees with Al Gore‟s 
Justice Department and bans ownership of 
firearms, what freedom is next?” 
Hope Response to the belief that a 
favorable outcome is 
possible in the future 
Bush Hope (OA = .989; Pi = .978): 
“The Bush education plan. Accountability. 
Standards. And a fresh start for America.” 
 
Gore Hope (OA = .951; Pi = .946): 
“Al Gore builds upon a foundation of fiscal 
discipline. Pay down the nation‟s debt, protect 
Social Security and Medicare, a $10,000 a year 
tax deduction for college tuition...” 
Pride Response to taking credit 
for a valued or desirable 
object or achievement 
Bush Pride (OA = .918; Pi = .890): 
“George Bush is cleaning up Texas. The 
Environmental Protection Agency reports that 
Texas leads America in reducing toxic pollution.” 
 
Gore Pride (OA = .888; Pi = .872): 
“He‟s taken on the worst polluters in America 
and become a leading voice for clean air, clean 
water, and the environment. Al Gore.” 
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 I recruited an assistant to recode all 305 ads for the purpose of calculating inter-
coder reliability.
16
 Table 3.1 reports observed agreement (OA) and Scott‟s Pi (Pi). All 
coefficients exceed standard minimum levels (.8 for OA, .7 for Pi). Coder disagreements 
were resolved through discussion, and the consensus coding was used in analyses. 
 
Measures 
Emotion. The 2000 NES asks respondents, “Has (Bush/Gore), because of the kind 
of person he is or because of something he has done, ever made you feel (emotion)?” 
This is a yes/no question, and respondents saying “yes” answer a subsequent item 
measuring emotion frequency. For easier presentation, I report analyses on the dummy 
item, but the findings are comparable when the dependent variable is an ordinal 
frequency measure. Thus, the results are robust to changes in the form of the dependent 
variable. Less than 1% of respondents do not recognize the candidates, answer “don‟t 
know,” or refuse to respond, so almost all responses are valid reports. 
Gross Rating Points. Appeal codes (1 = appeal present, 0 = appeal absent) were 
entered into the dataset containing the unique ad airings, then multiplied by the GRP of 
each airing. Those products were then added to obtain eight GRP measures of emotional 
appeals by market: Bush anger (total GRP of ads containing anger appeals directed at 
Bush), Bush fear, Bush hope, Bush pride, Gore anger, Gore fear, Gore hope, and Gore 
pride. Figure 3.2 and 3.3 plot the total GRP of emotional appeals targeted at Bush and 
Gore respectively by media market. Similar to Figure 3.1, the emotional appeal GRP 
plots are heavily skewed with many markets receiving little to no advertising and others 
                                                 
16
 Thanks to Peter Bobkowski of the UNC School of Journalism and Mass Communication for his help. 
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experiencing a relative deluge of ads. Again, I do not transform these distributions 
because the GRP values have actual meaning for market penetration. 
Sophistication. Political sophistication is a factor score constructed from interest, 
knowledge, and attention. I use the standard 3-point NES political interest item and the 5- 
point attention to campaign news measure. I construct an additive knowledge scale from 
four measures of recognition of major political figures (Trent Lott, William Rehnquist, 
Tony Blair, Janet Reno) and two measures about majority party control in the House and 
Senate. All three measures load onto one dimension in principal components analysis 
(eigenvalue = 1.944; loadings: attention = .854. interest = .834, knowledge = .821). I 
combine these three indicators into a factor score that represents the underlying 
dimension of political sophistication (M = 0, SD = 1). 
Controls. I include the same controls used in the first chapter. Demographics 
include age, race (1 = white, 0 = non-white), sex (1 = female, 0 = male), education (1 = 
less than high school, 7 = graduate degree), and household income (as asked in 2000 and 
not the standardized cumulative NES measure; 1 = less than $4,999, 22 = $200,000 and 
over). Also included are the standard 7-point partisanship scale (1 = strong Democrat, 7 = 
strong Republican) and the standard 7-point ideology scale (1 = strong liberal, 7 = strong 
conservative). Issue distance is again measured as the average squared deviation between 
the respondent‟s positions and the mean candidate placement position from the entire 
NES sample (Alvarez 1997). 



















































































































Direct Effects of Sophistication and Information Context 
Figure 3.4 shows the percentages of NES respondents living in tracked markets who 
report emotional responses to the candidates. Hope is the most common emotion for both 
nominees, with over 40% of the subsample reporting it for each. Fear, however, is the 
least common emotion. This pattern is similar to other NES samples from 1980 to 2004. 
Hope tends to be the most frequent reported emotion for candidates, and fear the least 
common. All percentages here are below 50%, so in no case does a majority of 
respondents feel any one emotion. This is the normal NES pattern for non-incumbents, 
including sitting or former vice presidents running for their own term, so the 2000 pattern 
is typical. Majorities often occur with appraisals of incumbents, except for with fear. 
Thus, emotion is more common when respondents are more familiar with a candidate. 
 
 

















 Table 3.2: Candidate Emotions, NES Respondents in 75 Largest Media Markets 
 Bush Gore 





















































































































































































LR 162.52*** 121.87*** 259.84*** 181.12 156.28*** 152.61*** 245.52*** 138.57*** 
Pseudo-R
2
 .161 .125 .227 .175 .147 .176 .213 .132 
N 832 832 
Note. Entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; cluster corrected standard errors are 
used with respondents clustered on media market; issue distance for the Bush emotions is the respondent issue distance from Bush; 






Before introducing information context measures into the analysis, I first examine 
individual characteristics and how they predict emotion. Table 2 applies the same model 
used to predict emotions in the pooled NES in Chapter 2 to appraisals of Bush and 
Gore.
17
 Only respondents living in the 75 tracked media markets are included in this 
analysis so that the model is tested on the same portion of the NES sample used in later 
analyses. The results strongly support H1, the basic theory at the core of this dissertation. 
Political sophistication is positively related to emotional appraisals in all eight models.  
Table 3.3 reports the direct effects of emotional appeals on appraisals of Bush and 
Gore.
18
 In seven of eight models, advertising employing a particular emotional theme 
significantly increases the likelihood that respondents will report feeling that emotion 
toward the targeted candidate. For example, an increase in GRP of anger appeals targeted 
at Bush in a market significantly increases the chance that respondents living there will 
feel angry at him, as see in the first column of estimates. The same is true of anger 
appeals directed at Gore, as demonstrated by the significant positive coefficient on anger 
GRP for reporting anger toward him. The sole exception is fear appeals directed at Gore 
which do not affect the intended emotion.  
The pattern of significant direct effects for seven categories of emotional appeals 
on the emotions and candidates they target is strong support for the idea that citizens as a 
                                                 
17
 The 2000 NES sampled 1807 respondents, 1439 of which lived in markets tracked by CMAG. There is 
no way to obtain advertising data for the 368 lost cases. However, there are no significant differences in the 
emotion means between the full sample and the subset of 1439. Also, the model in Table 3.2 performs 
similarly on both sets of respondents, so losing those cases does not bias my results. Of the remaining 1439 
cases, I lose 607 because of listwise deletion, largely due to missing income and ideology data. I have used 
AmeliaView to restore the full 1439 cases with multiple imputation, but the imputed data results are similar 
to those obtained using the 832. Thus, I am confident that missing data do not significantly bias the results. 
 
18
 My model specification assumes that appeals directed at one candidate do not predict emotions toward 
the other. Empirically, this assumption holds. Emotional appeals about one candidate are processed by 
respondents in relation to only that candidate. Given the low correlations of Bush and Gore emotions, this 
lack of effect indicates that emotions toward the two candidates are largely independent of one another. 
 Table 3.3: Candidate Emotions, Individual Characteristics and Advertising GRPs 
 Bush Gore 



































































































































































LR 281.48*** 171.45*** 242.50*** 222.68*** 233.83*** 248.20*** 311.18*** 187.72*** 
Pseudo-R
2
 .180 .149 .242 .191 .160 .189 .224 .144 
F (13, 809) 4.692*** 5.711*** 4.007*** 4.005*** 3.134*** 3.246*** 2.870** 2.839** 
N 832 832 
Note. Entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; cluster corrected standard errors are 
used with respondents clustered on media market; demographic controls were also estimated but are not shown for space reasons (see 
Appendix D); issue distance and advertising GRP are matched to the candidate; original GRP coefficients are multiplied by 1000 to 
show the effect of a 1000 GRP change; so the values of the five predictors are different for the four Bush columns versus the four 





whole are responsive to the content of advertising. It is important that in no instance do 
the combination of anger and fear or hope and pride GRPs significantly affect the same 
emotions. Anger appeals increase the likelihood of feeling angry. Fear appeals do not. 
Likewise, fear appeals increase the chance of feeling afraid, but anger does not. The same 
is true of positive appraisals like hope and pride and positive emotional appeals. Thus, 
respondents are reacting to the specific discrete emotions that permeate their information 
contexts. Their emotions are not simple reactions to campaign positivity and negativity. 
Whether ad makers consciously target specific discrete emotions is beside the 
point. Citizens react emotionally to ads as if those appeals are specially tailored. At some 
level, then, respondents are capable of processing the nuances of emotional appeals, and, 
as a result, become more likely to feel the targeted emotions as exposure to those appeals 
increases. This result bolsters the credibility of using a discrete framework to analyze 
advertising. Were the data to show broader positive and negative reactions, this would 
support a dimensional perspective such as affective intelligence. However, they do not. 
Further supporting the discrete approach is the fact that in six models in Table 3.3 
a second category of appeals significantly predicts appraisals, but in a negative 
direction.
19
 For example, hope GRPs targeting Bush decrease the chance that respondents 
in a market will fear him. The clear pattern in these negative results is time orientation. 
Fear and hope are both future-oriented emotions. Likewise, anger and pride both deal 
with the present or past. Thus, respondents again demonstrate their ability to see beyond 
pure affective tone. They correctly perceive the timing of discrete emotions, and 
emotional appeals which play to the same time orientation pull respondents in conflicting 
                                                 
19
 One of the exceptions to the two significant effects pattern actually supports the point made here. Fear 
appeals about Gore do not increase the chance that respondents will fear him, but hope appeals decrease 
that probability. Thus, anger at Gore is the only emotion that lacks a significant balancing effect. 
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directions. Arguing that Bush will do terrible things should he win is more than offset by 
arguments that he will do wonderful things, as seen in the Bush hope coefficient that is 
nearly twice the size of the fear GRP estimate for feeling afraid of him. To the extent that 
advertising effects are mediated through emotional experiences, this result helps explain 
why advertising messages and campaign effects more generally appear to cancel each 
other out in many studies (Brady and Johnston 2006). Emotional tugs in campaign ads 
matter, but they mostly matter because they neutralize the advertising of the opposition. 
 
Sophistication as a Moderator of Responsiveness to Information Context 
Now I test H2 to determine whether sophistication conditions the effect of emotional 
appeals on candidate appraisals. Imagine a market where 4000 GRPs of anger appeals 
against Gore aired through the campaign, roughly the median of anger appeals targeting 
him. The average television viewer in this market saw an ad with an anger appeal forty 
times, but the number of appeals high sophisticates saw may be greater than forty 
whereas low sophisticates may have seen fewer. High sophisticates are paying more 
attention to politics, so perhaps they are watching more programming such as local and 
national news that is campaign related. Indeed, campaign ads tend to air heavily during 
news broadcasts (Franz et al. 2008). Thus, they see more ads because they are watching 
shows where campaign advertising is more concentrated. Low sophisticates are less tuned 
into news about the campaign, so their exposure may be lower than the average. 
Exposure, however, is only part of the dynamic underlying the moderating role of 
sophistication. Even if high and low sophisticates see the same number of emotional 
appeals, those appeals may be more relevant to high sophisticates given their greater 
interest in and knowledge about politics. They likely understand those appeals better and 
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are more motivated to care about and react to them. All things being equal, living in a 
market where more of these appeals are aired may reinforce the messages in those ads, 
but more so for high sophisticates who are naturally more engaged with the campaign. 
Thus, whether the true mechanism is exposure or some mixture of understanding and 
motivation, the indicators that comprise sophistication may interact to make the 
appraisals of high sophisticates more responsive to emotional appeals. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 interact sophistication with GRPs to predict emotions toward 
Bush and Gore respectively.
20
 Five of the eight significant GRP coefficients for Bush 
emotions in Table 3.3 interact significantly with sophistication, as do three of the six 
significant Gore GRPs. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 plots these interactive relationships for Bush 
and Gore appraisals. Predicted probabilities are graphed at the GRP minimum (always 0), 
mean, and maximum values. Every plotted interaction shows the same pattern – political 
sophistication makes individuals more emotionally responsive to an increase in 
advertising GRPs appealing to specific emotional themes.  
Panel A in Figure 3.5, for example, shows the interactive effect of sophistication 
and anger appeals directed at Bush on the probability that respondents are angry at him. 
The unmarked line plots the effect of sophistication in a market with zero GRPs of anger 
appeals. The least sophisticated respondents at -2 SD on the factor score have only a 
6.7% chance of being angry at Bush as compared to a 34.5% chance for the highest 
sophisticates at +2 SD. Thus, in an information context with no ad stimulus, the highest 
sophisticates are about six times as likely to experience anger as the lowest.  
As anger GRPs targeting Bush increase, low and high sophisticates respond 
differently. Only respondents scoring at the sophistication mean and above demonstrate 
                                                 
20
 All interactions are the products of centered constituent terms. 
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Table 3.4: Bush Emotions with Sophistication and Advertising Interactions 
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LR 306.60*** 224.97*** 263.16*** 299.28*** 
Pseudo-R
2
 .191 .157 .251 .196 
F (17, 801) 2.726*** 1.903* 2.409** 1.247 
N 832 832 832 832 
Note. Entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients; standard errors in 
parentheses; cluster corrected standard errors are used with respondents clustered on media 
market; demographic controls were also estimated but are not shown for space reasons (see 
Appendix D); original GRP coefficients are multiplied by 1000 to show the effect of a 1000 
GRP change; F represents improvement in fit over a model with advertising GRPs but no 
interactions with sophistication; +p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 Figure 3.5: Predicted Probabilities of Bush Emotions with Sophistication and Advertising Interactions 
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Table 3.5: Gore Emotions with Sophistication and Advertising Interactions 
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LR 282.94*** 319.05*** 389.07*** 236.23*** 
Pseudo-R
2
 .169 .197 .235 .150 
F (17, 801) 2.171** 1.998** 2.883*** 1.415 
N 832 832 832 832 
Note. Entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients; standard errors in 
parentheses; cluster corrected standard errors are used with respondents clustered on media 
market; demographic controls were also estimated but are not shown for space reasons (see 
Appendix D); original GRP coefficients are multiplied by 1000 to show the effect of a 1000 
GRP change; F represents improvement in fit over a model with advertising GRPs but no 
interactions with sophistication; +p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 Figure 3.6: Predicted Probabilities of Gore Emotions, Sophistication and Advertising Interactions 
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any increased tendency to get angry at Bush in response to an increase in ads with that 
emotional theme, though that responsiveness is greater as sophistication increases. The 
7% increase between the min and the max of anger GRPs for respondents at -1 SD is 
insignificant. The lowest sophisticates actually become 1.4% less likely to feel anger 
moving from 0 to 111 exposures, an insignificant change but one that fits with Brader‟s 
(2006) finding that low sophisticates withdraw slightly in response to emotional ads.  
Panel B in Figure 3.5 plots the interaction of sophistication and pride appeals 
targeting Bush on the likelihood of being angry at him. The negative pride effect on anger 
is more pronounced among higher sophisticates. The unmarked line indicates a market 
with no pride appeals. In the absence of such messages, the highest sophisticates are 
about three times as likely to be angry at Bush as the lowest (18.1% chance at -2 SD, 
61.9% at +2 SD). At the GRP mean, however, where average viewers see 38 pride ads, 
the probability for the highest sophisticates is cut by two-thirds to 22.1% while the lowest 
sophisticates show an insignificant decrease to 14.9%. At the maximum value, roughly 
115 pride exposures, depresses the probability for those at +2 SD to only a 1.2% chance 
of being angry at Bush. Respondents at -2 SD drop to a 10% chance, but this value is 
statistically indistinguishable from their 18.1% chance in a market with no pride appeals.  
Thus, anger messages aimed at Bush increase the chance that respondents will be 
angry at him whereas pride messages decrease that probability. The effect of an increase 
in both types of appeals, however, varies by sophistication. Respondents scoring below 
the sophistication mean are, statistically speaking, relatively unresponsive to a change in 
ad exposures. Showing them more anger or pride appeals does not with any confidence 
change their appraisals. Those above the mean, however, are responding to changing ad 
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GRPs, with the highest sophisticates being even more responsive than those at the mean. 
Overall, though, anger and pride appeals in this instance tend to cancel each other out at 
all levels of sophistication. The predicted effects in Table 3.5 may look large, but their 
real effects are rather small given the balance of anger and pride appeals about Bush in 
most markets. The ultimate effect of advertising on appraisals, then, is highly contingent 
upon the ratio of emotional appeals aired in any one market. 
The pattern seen in the anger at Bush example repeats across all the significant 
interactions in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. High sophisticates are more emotionally responsive to 
information context than low sophisticates, at least when context is conceptualized as the 
emotional content of advertising. This interaction, however, is as much the product of 
high sophisticates being more responsive as it is low sophisticates being unresponsive. 
With few exceptions, respondents below the sophistication mean across all eight 
interactions are unmoved in response to emotional appeals, so it is the more informed and 
engaged respondents whose emotions are really shaped by advertising. Though only 
eight of the fourteen direct GRP effects in Table 3.3 interact significantly with 
sophistication, each of those interactions shows that sophistication enhances emotional 
responsiveness to advertising. Thus, these results strongly support H2. High sophisticates 
are both more emotional, and more emotionally responsive to their information contexts. 
 
Effects on Voting Behavior 
H3 posits that emotion will more strongly influence the political behavior of high 
sophisticates than. Thus, emotion and sophistication should interact significantly when 
modeling respondent behavior. With emotional appeals and appraisals of the candidates, 
the most logical action to examine is voting. In the next set of analyses, the dependent 
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variable is presidential vote choice in the 2000 election (1 = Gore vote, 0 = Bush vote). 
Before directly testing H3, however, I examine whether emotional appeals affect vote 
choice and whether sophistication moderates any such relationship. I have shown that 
sophistication moderates emotional responsiveness to advertising appeals. If the emotions 
of high sophisticates are more influenced by the messages in their information 
environments, might their votes also be more responsive to those same appeals?  
Table 3.6 models voting with predictors for emotion GRPs.
21
 The first column 
regresses vote choice on appeals directly. Only three categories of appeals significantly 
shape voting. No Bush appeal categories factor into vote choice, but anger, hope, and 
pride messages targeted at Gore do. These three effects are all in the expected direction, 
with anger reducing the chance of a Gore vote and hope and pride increasing it. The 
second column interacts appeal GRP with sophistication. Only the effect of fear appeals 
directed at Bush varies by sophistication level. This one interaction shows that fear 
appeals sway the votes of high sophisticates more than those of low sophisticates, an 
important contrast to the critique that “fear mongering” ads irrationally sway the 
uninformed masses (Brader 2006). However, the key point is that fear is the only 
significant interaction. Emotional appeals may affect vote choice directly, but the 
magnitude of those effects is largely not contingent upon sophistication. 
Table 3.7 also models vote choice, replacing advertising GRP with emotional 
appraisals of Bush and Gore. The first column tests direct emotion effects. Four emotions 
significantly shape voting behavior, all in the expected direction. Fear of Bush and 
hopefulness about Gore increase the likelihood that a respondent will vote for Gore. 
Hopefulness about Bush and anger at Gore make a Bush vote more likely.  
                                                 
21
 Of the 832 NES respondents in the emotion models, 197 did not vote, so the N is reduced. 
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Table 3.6: Presidential Vote with Sophistication and Advertising Interactions 
 No Interactions Interactions 
Sophistication .295 (.191) .041 (.429) 
Emotions Targeted at Bush:   
Anger GRP -.178 (.244) -.048 (.269) 
Fear GRP .189 (.233) -.049 (.252) 
Hope GRP .119 (.173) .013 (.216) 
Pride GRP .164 (.195) .177 (.207) 
Emotions Targeted at Gore:   
Anger GRP -.921 (.383)* -.812 (.455)+ 
Fear GRP .342 (.332) .408 (.369) 
Hope GRP -1.269 (.298)*** -1.384 (.369)*** 
Pride GRP 1.406 (.347)*** 1.629 (.406)*** 
Bush Appeal Interactions:   
Anger GRP X Sophistication  -.390 (.285) 
Fear GRP X Sophistication  .503 (.218)* 
Hope GRP X Sophistication  .038 (.270) 
Pride GRP X Sophistication  .231 (.281) 
Gore Appeal Interactions:   
Anger GRP X Sophistication  -.121 (.454) 
Fear GRP X Sophistication  -.152 (.217) 
Hope GRP X Sophistication  .318 (.729) 
Pride GRP X Sophistication  -.432 (.549) 
Controls:   
Ideology -.445 (.158)** -.479 (.156)** 
Partisanship -1.022 (.113)*** -1.027 (.112)*** 
Bush Issue Distance .794 (.189)*** .781 (.179)*** 
Gore Issue Distance -.653 (.181)*** -.669 (.181)*** 
Constant 3.257 (1.254)** 3.210 (1.293)* 
LR 383.15** 878.24*** 
Pseudo-R
2
 .675 .691 
F (27, 586)  3.812*** 
N 635 .635 
Note. Entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients; 
standard errors in parentheses; cluster corrected standard errors are 
used with respondents clustered on media market; demographic 
controls were also estimated (see Appendix E); GRP coefficients are 
multiplied by 1000 to show the effect of a 1000 GRP change; F tests 
improvement in fit over model with no interactions; +p < .1, *p < .05, 
**p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
The second column in Table 3.7 interacts emotion and sophistication. Three 
interactions are significant – fear of Bush, pride in Bush, and pride in Gore. The two 
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original hope variables and anger at Gore remain significant after specifying the 
interaction terms, but sophistication does not moderate their effects.  
 
Table 3.7: Presidential Vote with Sophistication and Emotion Interactions 
 No Interactions Interactions 
Sophistication .198 (.187) .488 (.396) 
Bush Emotions:   
Anger -.135 (.501) -.416 (.455) 
Fear 2.026 (.539)*** 2.302 (.519)*** 
Hope -2.139 (.473)*** -2.346 (.530)*** 
Pride -.575 (.595) -.326 (.616) 
Gore Emotions:   
Anger -.964 (.333)** -1.290 (.399)** 
Fear -.963 (.638) -.782 (.561) 
Hope 2.160 (.393)*** 2.244 (.415)*** 
Pride .798 (.489) .890 (.497)+ 
Bush Emotion Interactions:   
Anger X Sophistication  -.279 (.551) 
Fear X Sophistication  1.177 (.515)* 
Hope X Sophistication  -.508 (.718) 
Pride X Sophistication  -1.456 (.633)* 
Gore Emotion Interactions:   
Anger X Sophistication  -.307 (.749) 
Fear X Sophistication  -.499 (.853) 
Hope X Sophistication  -.404 (.597) 
Pride X Sophistication  1.316 (.554)* 
Controls:   
Ideology -.260 (.182) -.343 (.191)+ 
Partisanship -.809 (.126)*** -.920 (.134)*** 
Bush Issue Distance .817 (.315)* .782 (.327)* 
Gore Issue Distance -.635 (.220)** -.568 (.248)* 
Constant 2.471 (1.536) 2.955 (1.617)+ 
LR 337.70*** 291.93*** 
Pseudo-R
2
 .772 .789 
F (27, 586)  5.932*** 
N 635 635 
Note. Entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients; 
standard errors in parentheses; cluster corrected standard errors are 
used with respondents clustered on media market; demographic 
controls were also estimated (see Appendix E); F tests improvement in 




Figure 3.7 plots the significant interaction effects. In each case emotional 
appraisals are stronger influences on the vote choices of high sophisticates than those of 
low sophisticates. For example, holding other predictors at their means, respondents at -2 
SD on sophistication who are proud of Bush still have more than an 80% chance of 
voting for Gore even though this emotion should encourage a Bush vote. High 
sophisticates at +2 SD who are also proud of Bush, however, only have about a 10% 
chance voting for Gore. Similar action biases are evident in the remaining two plots.   
 
Figure 3.7: Predicted Probability of Gore Vote, 





















Thus, the action tendencies emotions induce are most evident in the voting of 
more sophisticated respondents, strongly supporting H3 that sophistication enables either 
the understanding or the motivation to translate emotion into political action. These 
results also show that emotional cues interact with sophistication to affect vote choice, 
but only indirectly. By and large, sophistication does not directly condition the effect of 
advertising on voting. Ad appeals, however, make certain emotions more or less likely, 
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particularly for high sophisticates. Sophistication then moderates the effects of those 
emotions on voting about half of the time. Thus, the respondents whose voting is most 
influenced by emotions are highly sophisticated ones, but also ones living in markets with 
greater exposure to the campaign advertising that elicits those emotions in the first place. 
The voters least likely to act on emotion are lower sophisticates. However, campaign ads 
barely affect their appraisals, so the indirect interaction of ad appeals and sophistication is 




Sophistication as a Moderator in Policy Attitudes 
The student sample used to test emotion paradata in Chapter 2 allows me to test H3 in 
another context – the expression of policy attitudes. Table 3.8 adapts the latency ratio and 
response change models to predict Iraq War policy attitudes, but now incorporates 
emotional appraisals of the Iraq War and the interactions of those emotions with 
sophistication. Again, sophistication moderates the effect of emotion in a number of 
instances. Positive interaction signs indicate that high sophisticates who experience a 
particular emotion are more likely to agree with policy statements than low sophisticates 
who also feel that emotion. Negative signs mean that high sophisticates are more likely to 
disagree than similarly emotional low sophisticates. 
 Figure 3.8 plots two significant interactions.
23
 Panel A shows the interaction of 
anger at the US and sophistication for agreeing that “the US should send more troops to 
                                                 
22
 I replicated the analysis in Table 3.7 using the pooled 1980-2004 NES data used in Chapter 2. I find 
similar results in those data. Half of the pooled sophistication and emotion interactions are significant, with 
emotion being a stronger influence on the voting of high sophisticates in each instance. Thus, these 
interactive effects are not simply an artifact of some dynamic unique to the 2000 election. 
 
23
 All interaction plots show similar patterns, so only two are plotted. The choice of interactions is arbitrary. 
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τ1 -4.439 -3.415 -1.139 .741 
τ2 -2.444 -2.013 .184 2.325 
τ3 -1.354 -.859 1.519 3.854 
τ4 .681 1.496 3.342 6.098 
LR 76.25*** 64.39*** 177.73*** 127.55*** 
Pseudo-R
2
 .075 .064 .151 .127 
F (17, 343/342) 2.138** 2.021** 3.342*** 3.743*** 
N 374 373 374 374 
Note. Entries are unstandardized ordinal logistic regression coefficients; demographic 
controls were also estimates (see Appendix E); F represents improvement in fit over the 
model with no interactions; +p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Iraq to fight the militia and terrorist organizations responsible for violence there.” 
Respondents who feel angry at the US are more likely to disagree with sending troops, 
perhaps seeing this position as an appropriate remedy to some perceived wrong the US 
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has committed. The effect of anger, however, is more pronounced among high 
sophisticates. Low sophisticates at -2 SD have a combined probability of 60.1% of 
choosing one of the two disagree categories as compared to an 81.6% chance for high 
sophisticates at +2 SD. Though disagreement with sending more troops is the dominant 
sentiment among angry respondents at all levels of sophistication, high sophisticates are 
more attracted to the extreme “disagree strongly” category than angry low sophisticates. 
Indeed, at the lowest levels of sophistication, angry respondents are just as likely to have 
no opinion on troops as they are to disagree strongly with sending more. However, 
among the highest sophisticates, the more extreme sentiment is the most likely. 
Panel B plots the interaction of sympathy for the Iraqis and sophistication for 
agreeing that “the US should increase financial aid to Iraq to repair damage to 
infrastructure like roads and bridges caused by the US invasion.” Sympathy, an emotion 
that motivates helping actions meant to alleviate the suffering of others (Haidt 2003), 
elicits agreement with the infrastructure statement, but it is a stronger influence on the 
attitudes of high sophisticates. The lowest sophisticates who feel sympathy have a 43% 
chance of agreeing with reparative aid, but only a 6.7% chance of strongly agreeing. In 
fact, “agree strongly” is the least likely choice of respondents at -2 SD. High 
sophisticates, however, are much more likely to agree with reparative aid as the highest 
sophisticates at +2 SD have a combined probability of 87.1% of agreeing with the policy 
statement. Indeed, the most dramatic movement across the sophistication spectrum occurs 
in the “agree strongly” category. Thus, the finding that high sophisticates rely more upon 
emotion in their voting behavior replicates to attitude expression, so this relationship is 
robust across behavioral domains. 
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 Figure 3.8: Sophistication and Emotion Interactions for Policy Attitudes 
 
 


















































In the previous chapter, I established that high political sophisticates are more likely to 
experience emotional reactions to politics than low sophisticates, and I rigorously tested 
that relationship through analysis of response latency and response change paradata. I can 
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confidently say, then, that more sophisticated individuals are indeed more emotional 
about politics than lower sophisticates. In this chapter, I have pushed that relationship 
further by demonstrating a role for information context in eliciting emotion and by 
showing behavioral consequences for the sophistication-emotion relationship. High 
sophisticates are more emotionally responsive to politically-relevant emotional stimuli in 
the information environment around them. Emotion is also more likely to affect the 
behavior of high sophisticates than low sophisticates, a pattern demonstrated in both 
voting behavior and the expression of policy attitudes toward the Iraq War. 
Overall, then, my analyses thus far show that high sophisticates are more 
emotional about political stimuli, more responsive to emotional cues in their information 
contexts, and more responsive to emotion action tendencies in their behavior. These 
findings powerfully undermine the traditional stereotype that emotion is a low 
sophistication phenomenon. It is not the least informed and least engaged citizens who 
are more likely to think about politics in emotional terms or whose behavior is more 
likely to be swayed by emotional whims. Rather, it is informed and engaged voters who 
exhibit these qualities. Emotion, then, is a product of knowing about and caring about 
politics, not ignorance of political life. These results are interesting on the surface, but, 
more importantly, we must rethink how we normatively view the role of emotion in 
democracy. Can emotion be irrational and dangerous if those citizens we value most for 
their engagement with politics are also the most emotional about it? I will return to this 
question in the conclusion of this dissertation. 
This chapter has certain strengths and weaknesses that affect how it informs my 
dissertation. It is more useful than a simple survey analysis because the CMAG data offer 
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the ability to conduct a quasi-experiment given the immense variation in ad exposure 
across markets. I can assert with confidence, then, that the information context results 
presented here are the product of more than mere correlation. That these results are 
discovered in a quasi-experimental design hints that the relationship between 
sophistication and emotion is a causal one. It is not just that high sophisticates happen to 
be more emotional about political stimuli. Their greater engagement with politics is likely 
causing that emotionality. That assertion would be stronger, however, with a truly 
randomized experimental manipulation, something I offer in the next chapter.  
Campaign ads are just one way to conceptualize information context, and no one 
operationalization is inherently better than another as citizens encounter political 
information in many forms. The next chapter reconceptualizes context as print and 
television news, but finds similar results for how sophistication moderates emotional 
responsiveness. I also expand my inquiry into behavioral effects into learning, and show 
that high sophisticates are more susceptible to the learning biases that emotions induce. 
Thus, even though in this chapter I choose one type of context to examine, I replicate its 
findings in different settings and on different types of behavioral variables.  
My coding scheme does ignore certain aspects of emotional appeals, including 
their strength, dominance of an appeal in an ad, and the number of appeals to the same 
emotion in an ad. If a fear message about Bush claims that he will do ten terrible things if 
he wins, that ad is coded the same as an ad that only makes one fear appeal. While some 
of these other characteristics may affect the likelihood of an emotional response, the GRP 
measures I construct based on the mere presence of an emotional appeal are not 
inherently flawed. They simply measure one aspect of the information environment. 
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Lastly, the specific results presented here are almost assuredly in part an artifact 
of circumstances unique to the 2000 election. Were I to choose a different election, the 
distribution of ads and their emotional appeals might be different across and within 
markets. With different candidates or an election featuring an incumbent, the specific 
emotions that predict voting either directly or when interacted with sophistication might 
be different. I am confident in predicting, however, that the broad findings would be the 
same were I to replicate this analysis in a different year. High sophisticates would still be 
more emotional, more responsive to emotional appeals, and more swayed by emotion in 
their voting. The significance of particular emotions might change, but the conclusions 
would be the same. 
 Chapter 4 
 
An Experimental Exploration of Emotional Cues in News Media 
 
Abstract: This chapter describes a randomized experiment of roughly 860 
undergraduates that further tests the hypotheses advanced thus far in this dissertation. I 
reconceptualize information context as the news media, namely print and television news 
about illegal immigration. I argue that contexts which rely upon more emotional cues 
(specifically audiovisual stimuli and explicit emotional frames) to convey information 
will prompt both greater emotional responsiveness and higher levels of learning as a 
general rule, but that sophistication moderates the magnitudes of those contextual effects. 
I again demonstrate that high sophisticates are more emotional about political stimuli, 
and that emotion is a stronger influence on their behavior – operationalized here as 
learning from news stories – than that of low sophisticates. Thus, this chapter offers the 
most solid evidence yet that the relationship between sophistication and emotion is not 
merely correlational in nature, but causal. I then discuss the larger practical and 
theoretical implications of this chapter. 
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Analyses thus far demonstrate substantial support for the core theory of my dissertation. 
Political sophistication is indeed positively related to the experience of emotion in 
reaction to politics. Furthermore, high sophisticates are also more emotionally responsive 
to emotional appeals in the information contexts around them and more reliant upon 
emotion in their political actions and attitudes. This chapter provides further tests of my 
central hypotheses using a randomized experiment of undergraduates. Analyses this far 
have relied largely on cross-sectional data that provide little insight into causal processes, 
so a randomized experiment is useful for establishing causality between sophistication 
and emotion and for ruling out the possibility that an endogenous relationship between 
emotion and sophistication is influencing the results. I reconceptualize information 
context as print and video news about illegal immigration and again show that high 
sophisticates are more responsive to emotional cues in the media they consume. I also 
show again that emotion-induced action tendencies are a greater influence on the 
behavior of high sophisticates, but this time in learning behavior rather than voting or 
attitude expression. 
 
News Media as Information Context 
The news media represent another “context” in which ordinary citizens might encounter 
political information. The focus here is on the conventional news media, meaning 
television and print outlets, and how the emotional cues in these environments moderate 
the relationship between sophistication and emotion. Traditional media, despite declining 
consumption rates, are still where most Americans are exposed to political news, making 
them the most important source of political information for the average citizen (Kinder 
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2003; Prior 2007). These media present information in different ways, however, 
employing various formats, modalities, and frames to engage consumers. For example, 
print news is limited to the visual modality with its reliance on words and pictures, but 
television news offers a wealth of visual and auditory cues. Even within a particular 
format there is variation in news presentation. Some media rely more on the traditional 
hard news style which emphasizes balanced facts and frames that place stories within the 
context of broader political issues, and where emotional angles are deemphasized (Baum 
2003). Other outlets prefer the soft news style that emphasizes analysis of events, 
episodic frames, human interest angles, and the emotional side of stories. 
 Presentation style matters for the understanding of news because it affects 
information processing. One way in which media presentation style varies is in the use of 
different modalities, meaning various types of visual and audio stimuli. The brain 
naturally processes stimuli from multiple senses simultaneously. Humans understand and 
learn better when the information they are exposed to is rich in sensory stimuli, thereby 
more closely resembling normal brain functioning (Graber 1990, 2001, 2004; Lewis 
1984; Pryluck 1976). News formats such as television, then, are more conducive to the 
ability of average citizens to engage with information and store it in long-term memory 
than less stimulating formats such as print. Many studies demonstrate that stimuli rich in 
visual and audio modalities enhance information processing capabilities by making both 
the encoding of information in long-term memory and the retrieval of that information 
easier (Berry and Brosius 1991; Crigler, Just, and Neuman 1994; Graber 2001; Gregory 
1997; Lang and Friestad 1993; Messaris 1994; Nelson and Boynton 1997; Paivio 1979; 
Van Der Molen and Van Der Voort 2000; Woodall 1986).  
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Similarly, news reported from clear emotional angles motivates engagement with 
information (Biocca 1991; Jamieson and Waldman 2003; McQuail 1997) in comparison 
to balanced or neutral hard news that consumers tend to find boring (Baum 2002, 2003; 
Brants 1998). Emotionally compelling slants facilitate learning from the media, a pattern 
that makes sense as we now know that emotion and cognition work together rather than 
against one another as humans reason (Sniderman et al. 1991; Damasio 1994; Marcus et 
al. 2000). Though there are normative concerns about the manipulation of emotion and 
the usage of audiovisuals in news (see Graber, 2001 for a review), these cues are on 
balance desirable if the goal of the media are to educate the public about politics.  
Given that presentation style affects information processing, it is reasonable to 
posit that the way in which news is communicated moderates the relationship between 
political sophistication and emotion. News formats low on sensory and emotional stimuli 
(henceforth called “emotional cues”24), namely print media that more closely resemble 
hard news, require greater cognitive effort and sophistication to engage with as they less 
closely resemble how the brain naturally functions (Grabe and Bucy 2009; Graber 2001, 
2004). Contexts with more emotional cues are less cognitively demanding to understand 
and process. Thus, the ability to appraise information should be greater when more 
emotional cues are present in media. Consumers should be more likely to react 
emotionally to television news, for example, than to print news because of the presence 
of stimuli from audio and additional visual modalities (e.g. voices and their tone, sounds, 
music, etc.). Emotional responsiveness should also be greater to news presented with an 
emotional frame than to news that is neutral and lacking in a clear emotional angle.  
                                                 
24
 Brader (2006) also uses the term “emotional cues” to refer to stimuli that might trigger emotional 
responses. His study dealt with campaign advertising, specifically how audio and visual stimuli such as 
pictures, movement, music, sound, and voice elicit emotion among voters. I borrow the term from him. 
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Learning Effects 
Though media qualities may shape emotional appraisals, the product of the psyche‟s 
interacting with the information environment is learning (Graber 2001, 2004). Emotions 
affect learning as they motivate individuals to direct attention toward or away from 
stimuli that are relevant to the core relational themes of each particular emotion (Bower 
1981; Leichtman, Cecci and Ornstein 1992; Nabi 1999, 2003). However, all emotions do 
not affect learning similarly. Fear focuses attention on threatening stimuli (e.g. Eysenck 
1992; LeDoux 1996; MacLeod and Matthews 1988; Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus 
et al. 2000). Fear deals with uncertainty, so humans are motivated to learn new 
information about threats to reduce that uncertainty. Fear induces greater central 
processing that makes the encoding of information into long-term memory easier 
(McGaugh and Cahill 2003). 
Learning evidence is less clear with other emotions, notably anger.  Dimensional 
perspectives posit that negative emotions universally heighten attention toward negative 
stimuli (e.g. Gray 1987; Watson et al. 1999), but other scholars have shown that anger 
affects action more than attention (Berenbaum, Fujita, and Pfenning 1995). Indeed, 
Valentino et al. (2008) find that anger actually depresses attention and learning. They 
posit that anger results from the certainty that an object violates values or norms, and that 
certainty does not require learning. Rather, it begs action over attention (Berkowitz 
2003). Huddy et al. (2007) find a positive attention effect for anger, but further argue that 
anger produces biased learning processes rather than “objective” evaluation of incoming 
information about the aggravating object in question. 
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Positive emotions do affect learning, but these effects are also inconsistent. Isbell 
et al. (2006) argue that happiness depresses systematic processing, thereby discouraging 
learning. However, enthusiasm, a dimension of emotion in the affective intelligence 
approach, encourages learning by eliciting information seeking behaviors (Marcus et al. 
2000; Brader 2006). Moreover, beyond the distinction between positive and negative 
emotion, emotionality in general promotes greater cognitive engagement and learning 
(Civettini and Redlawsk 2009; Heuer and Reisberg 1992). Thus, particular emotions 
aside, the main point of the extant literature is that emotions motivate the direction of 
attention in ways that either inhibit or promote encoding of new information. 
Emotion, then, plays a key role in learning. Therefore, if political sophistication 
and media context affect the experience of emotion, then the interaction of these three 
factors should ultimately shape how citizens learn from the media they consume. That is, 
media context and sophistication should together moderate the effect of emotion on 
learning. If media contexts with more emotional cues are easier to engage with and 
process, thereby eliciting greater emotionality, then learning should be greater in contexts 
where more cues are provided. Thus, news in video format should yield greater learning 
than the same news in print because of its usage of more audio and visual modalities. 
Likewise, news presented with a clear emotional frame should be easier for consumers to 
learn from than news that is more balanced and objective (consistent with Civettini and 
Redlawsk 2009, Heuer and Resiberg 1992).  
However, regardless of the news format, I posit that sophistication moderates the 
effect of emotion on learning. Emotions affect learning because they motivate humans to 
alter how attentive they are to particular objects. Some emotions encourage greater 
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attention to certain attitude objects with learning as a goal, but other emotions reduce the 
motivation to learn because those emotions are more action oriented. Given that high 
sophisticates are more interested in politics and more capable of engaging with political 
stimuli, they should be more susceptible to any learning biases of emotion. If an emotion 
encourages learning, then that effect should be most pronounced among the naturally 
more motivated high sophisticates who feel it. Likewise, if an emotion depresses 
learning, then learning should be lowest for high sophisticates who feel that emotion than 




H1:  Media formats with more emotional cues will elicit more emotion. 
Thus, news in video format will elicit more emotion than news in print. News 
with an emotional tone will elicit more emotion than news framed in a balanced manner. 
 
H2: Sophistication will positively affect emotional responsiveness regardless of media 
format. 
 Consistent with my prior theory and results, I expect that high sophisticates 
should be more likely to report emotional appraisals than low sophisticates regardless of 
the qualities that characterize the media participants consume. Thus, high sophisticates 
should always be more emotional even if contexts with more cueing are more effective at 
eliciting emotion across the sophistication spectrum than those with less cueing.  
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H3: Media formats with more emotional cues will stimulate more learning than those 
with fewer such cues. 
Thus, news in video will elicit more learning than news in print. News presented 
with an emotional tone will elicit more learning than news in a more balanced manner. 
 
H4: Learning effects will be more pronounced among high sophisticates than among low 
sophisticates who experience the same emotion. 
Sophistication and emotion will interact to affect learning. Thus, learning biases 
will be more evident among emotional high sophisticates. In this chapter I deal 
specifically with anger and sympathy. Specifically, I posit that angry high sophisticates 
should learn less from the media than angry low sophisticates as anger is an emotion that 
tends to depress learning. However, sympathetic high sophisticates should learn more 
than sympathetic low sophisticates as sympathy encourages engagement. 
 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 828 undergraduates enrolled in introductory 
political science classes at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in spring of 
2009. Students participated to fulfill a research requirement. They ranged from 18 to 30 
years old (M = 19.982, SD = 1.598; see Appendix F for question wording and scaling), 
with a plurality being freshmen (M = 2.239, SD = 1.057). Most students were female 
(62%) and white (78%; 10% black, 4% Hispanic, 3% Asian), demographics that resemble 
the broader UNC population. The sample leaned Democratic (M = 3.391, SD = 2.039, 
and slightly liberal (M = 3.838, SD = 2.058). 
103 
Experimental Design. This experiment was a 2 X 3 design in which news format 
(print or video) and emotional tone (neutral, anger, sympathy) were manipulated. Thus, 
all stories in a particular condition were either read or watched (no combination thereof) 
and exuded a clear emotional frame. A seventh condition was a control with no stimulus. 
The seven conditions are hereafter referred to as: control, neutral print, neutral video, 
anger print, anger video, sympathy print, and sympathy video. Each treatment condition, 
except the control, contained three stories about illegal immigration. Participants in each 
condition either read or watched all three stories and completed the experiment in one 
sitting with no measures repeated over time, making this a between-subjects design as the 
critical comparisons are between subjects in different conditions rather than change 
within individual participants as a result of the stimuli. 
Randomization. Students were randomly assigned to conditions using a random 
number generator. Before conducting any analyses, it was necessary to check that the 
randomization process worked in that participants did not vary significantly by condition 
on political sophistication, the key individual level variable in this study. As the final 
sophistication variable is a factor score with an artificial mean of 0, difference of means 
tests are conducted on the three indicators of that variable: attention, interest, and a 
knowledge scale. These tests show no significant differences on any of the three 
indicators by condition [attention: ANOVA, F (6, 821) = .89, p < 1; Kruskal-Wallis, χ2 
(6) = 4.542, p < 1; interest: F (6, 821) = .74, p < 1; χ2 (6) = 3.333, p < 1; knowledge: F (6, 
821) = 1.15, p < 1; χ2 (6) = 7.029, p < 1]. Scheffe tests corroborate these results (p < 1 for 
all pairwise comparisons of condition means on all three sophistication components). 
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Procedure. The experiment was conducted using a web based survey program. 
Participants received individualized email invitations to access the study, and were 
allowed to take the experiment from locations of their choice as a lab setting might have 
exacerbated the already artificially high attention to stimuli that experiments introduce. 
Students in all seven conditions were administered the pre-test and the post-test, though 
the control post-test did not measure learning. Participants in the video conditions viewed 
the videos in random order through the survey program. The videos were hosted on my 
personal webspace so that the user comments, ads, and editorialized headlines common 
on YouTube videos were not visible to participants. Those in print conditions saw the 
print stories in random order. Latency timers were placed on the webpages containing 
stories so that those participants who did not watch or read the treatments could be 
dropped from final analyses (N= 38). Final condition cell sizes ranged from 114 to 124. 
Stimuli. All stories were authentic local television news reports from various 
American media markets. Real television stories were preferred for greater construct 
validity of the reports in the video conditions. The stories were found on YouTube 
searching for “illegal immigration” stories, downloaded, and then edited to remove 
commercials and unrelated lead-ins.  
Multiple stories to represent each tone were used to eliminate the confound of 
testing the design using just one story. Thus, unique story elements such as reporter race 
or sex, the specific aspect of illegal immigration at issue, or the location of the story 
ideally wash out as these elements vary within and between conditions, leaving the 
overarching emotional tone of the stories in each condition as the unifying element of the 
three that most stands out to participants. The stories in the neutral news condition all 
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presented a mixture of positive and negative information about different aspects of illegal 
immigration, and lacked a clear emotional tone (see Appendices G – O for the print 
versions of the nine stories).
25
 Anger stories depicted illegal immigrants engaging in 
activities that violate legal or social norms, actions that should elicit anger responses as 
that emotion deals with repudiation of norm violations (Haidt 2003). Sympathy stories 
portrayed illegal immigrants as suffering from hardships and wrongs, situations that 
should elicit sympathy as that emotion is a response to the suffering of others (Haidt 
2003). Having two emotions allows generalization of the study beyond the context of one 
emotion, but anger and sympathy in particular were selected due to the ease of obtaining 
stories with those emotional slants. 
Though I selected the television stories based on my perception of their emotional 
tones, I did rely on the judgments of three colleagues to help validate my groupings. All 
agreed that the three neutral stories presented a balance positive and negative information 
and lacked overt emotional frames. Likewise, all agreed that the three anger and three 
sympathy conditions carried their perceived emotional slants. The intensity of those 
emotional frames, however, also factored into my selection criteria. I selected neutral 
stories that were as cool and detached from the subject material as possible, whereas I 
selected anger and sympathy treatments that overtly featured moving visuals, editorial 
comments by reporters and anchors, and detectable emotional tones in the voices of the 
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 Neutral stories dealt with immigrant population growth, an ICE raid on a factory, and the costs of treating 
illegal immigrants in hospitals. Anger stories covered two illegal immigrants who murdered a teenage girl, 
illegal immigrants stealing Social Security numbers to commit fraud, and destruction of desert habitats that 
immigrants cause when infiltrating the US. Sympathy stories depicted the hardships of a girl whose mother 
was taken by ICE, the poverty of illegal immigrants, and the murder of an illegal immigrant in a hate crime. 
I have posted the videos on my YouTube channel (http://www.youtube.com/user/unc1693). YouTube 
management deleted the sympathy video about the murdered illegal immigrant from my channel homepage 
because its Associated Press copyright put me in violation of the YouTube user agreement. The original 
version is no longer available on the AP channel. The other eight videos are still viewable on my page. 
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speakers. None of the three colleagues consulted labeled any of the stories in a condition 
as being noticeably more or less neutral or emotionally slanted than the others. Thus, 
though I relied on the expert judgment of compatriots to validate my groupings, there was 
an attempt to check my choice of treatment stories. 
For the three print conditions, the video stories were transcribed verbatim, though 
verbal fillers and reporter sign offs were removed. The scripts were modified to resemble 
newspaper stories. Bylines and datelines were added with the same names and locations 
from the video versions. Quote attributions (e.g. “he said,” “she said,” etc.) were also 
added. No headlines were given to the print stories. Thus, the print condition conveys the 
same information spoken in the video conditions, but with modifications to make the 
stories resemble newspaper articles. 
 
Measures 
Experimental Variables. Two variables indicate the nature of emotional cues in 
the seven conditions. One variable represents presentation format (1 = control, 2 = print, 
3 = video). Another variable signifies emotional slant (1 = control, 2 = neutral, 3 = anger 
or sympathy). I combine the anger and sympathy conditions into the same value on this 
last variable because I have no theoretical interest in either the effect of anger in the 
sympathy conditions or the effect of sympathy in the anger conditions. Thus, I separate 
the anger and sympathy conditions in my analyses except when calculating difference of 
means tests. For example, when I model anger appraisals in Table X, only the five 
conditions representing the control, the two neutral conditions, and the two anger 
conditions are included in that analysis.  
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Emotion. The post-test measured intensity of emotional reactions. Respondents 
were asked, “Does the illegal immigration situation make you feel (emotion)? If so, how 
(emotion) do you feel?” Responses ranged from 0 (no) to 4 (extremely). The post-test 
measured ten emotions: angry at illegal immigrants, angry at employers who hire illegal 
immigrants, sympathy toward illegal immigrants, guilt that the government has not done 
more to help illegal immigrants, afraid, proud, hopeful, disgusted at illegal immigrants, 
and disgusted at employers, and contempt toward illegal immigrants. 
Learning. Treatment condition post-tests included nine items about information in 
the treatment stories. These included four fill-in-the-blank questions to measure cued 
recall and five multiple-choice items to tap recognition memory (Padilla-Walker and 
Poole 2002). Open-ended items were scored for correctness, then all nine items were 
combined into an additive learning scale (0-9; α calculated by condition and ranged from 
.716 to .865). 
Sophistication. Political sophistication is a factor score derived from principal 
component analysis (M = 0, SD = 1). Three indicators of sophistication are used: 
attention to politics (M = 3.141, SD = .723), interest in politics (M = 2.356, SD = .614), 
and a political knowledge scale (M = 2.911, SD = 1.487; α = .821). Only one eigenvalue 
exceeds 1 (2.095), and all three indicators load strongly onto it (attention, .889; interest, 
.878; knowledge, .753). See Appendix F for question wordings. 
Controls. Several controls were included in emotional reaction and learning 
models. These included ideology and partisanship (both measured as the traditional 7-
point NES scale), economic class, academic year as a proxy for the little age and 
education variance in the sample, and dummies for female and white (see Appendix F). 
108 
Random assignment ensures that any systematic group differences on items that are not 
dependent variables are due to chance, but it is still necessary to control for these 
demographic and political characteristics if they can influence the dependent variables.  
Manipulation Check. Difference of means tests were run on ordinal emotion items 
from the post-test. Emotions tested included anger (at illegal aliens, at employers who 
hire illegal immigrants), disgust (at illegal immigrants, at employers) sympathy (for 
illegal immigrants), fear (of illegal immigration), pride, guilt, and hope. Scheffe tests 
showed that the six treatment conditions significantly prompted several positive and 
negative emotions when compared to the control (p < .05 for all pairwise comparisons of 
the treatment conditions to the control for pride, disgust at illegal immigrants, and anger 
at employers who hire illegal immigrants; p < 1 for all comparisons of treatment 
condition dyads for the same three emotions). As the control provided no stimulus, it is 
reasonable that a treatment of any kind might elicit a general emotional response about 
immigration, but not one that varies between the treatment conditions themselves if those 
particular emotions are not manipulated. Table 4.1 shows the means and standard 
deviations of the ten measured emotions by condition. 
The conditions with anger and sympathy frames were effective at eliciting higher 
levels of only the intended emotions when compared to their respective neutral 
conditions. In the anger print condition, anger at illegal immigrants is the only emotion 
whose mean differs from the neutral print (p < .001) condition, while the same is true 
when comparing the anger video to the neutral video condition (p < .001).  Likewise, 
sympathy for illegal immigrants is the only emotion with a significantly larger mean 
when comparing the sympathy print to the neutral print condition (p < .001) and the
 Table 4.1: Means and Standard Deviations of Emotions by Condition 





























































































































































 sympathy video to the neutral video condition (p < .001). These results show that the 




Eliciting Emotions toward Illegal Immigration 
H1 posits that media formats with more emotional cues, those that use more audiovisual 
modalities or clear emotional frames, will elicit greater emotion. I used one-way ANOVA 
and Kruskal-Wallis tests to evaluate the between-subjects relationship between emotion 
and experiment condition. The independent variable was a 7-point nominal item 
indicating the assigned experimental condition of the respondent. The two dependent 
variables, tested in separate analyses, are the 5-point strength of anger and sympathy 
toward illegal immigrants measures. Figure 4.1 shows the emotion means by condition. 
Main effects observed in difference of means tests for anger [F (6, 821) = 18.1, p < .001; 
χ2 (6) = 63.723, p < .01] and sympathy [F (6, 821) = 21.42, p < .001; χ2 (6) = 63.889, p < 
.001] show significant differences in reported emotion levels between conditions. The η2 
for anger and sympathy are .119 and .128 respectively, indicating a moderate relationship 
between the experimental conditions and respondent emotions as the manipulations 
account for a little over 10% of the overall variance in both dependent variables. 
 Scheffe tests were conducted to evaluate pairwise differences among the 
condition means. Scheffe tests provide very conservative difference tests between all 
possible condition dyads, reducing the possibility of Type-I error substantially compared 
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to other post-hoc tests (Cohen et al. 2003). Let us first examine how the treatment 
conditions compare to the control. Neutral print means are slightly larger but statistically 
indistinguishable from the control (anger, p < 1; sympathy, p < 1). However, means for 
anger in the anger print condition (p < .01) and sympathy in sympathy print (p < .001) are 
significantly higher. Thus, neutral information in print is insufficient to stimulate greater 
emotion overall, but print paired with a clear emotional frame is more effective at 
eliciting a targeted emotion.  
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The neutral video condition elicits more of both anger (p < .05) and sympathy (p 
< .001) than the control. The anger video effectively prompts only anger (p < .001). The 
sympathy video condition only elicits sympathy (p < .001). The presence of additional 
audiovisual cues, then, even paired with balanced information in the news content, 
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stimulates multiple emotional appraisals. A video format is even more stimulating, 
however, when the information it conveys has a clear emotional slant. 
 When the control is no longer the baseline for comparison, significant between-
group differences result from the presence of emotional cues in media stimuli. Compared 
to the neutral print condition, the neutral video stimulus elicits more anger (p < .05) and 
sympathy (p < .05). The anger video condition induces greater anger than the anger print 
condition (p < .05), as does the sympathy video condition with sympathy when compared 
to the print (p < .01). These results show a significant causal effect of audiovisual cues, 
but similar effects exist for emotional tone. Anger is greater in the anger print condition 
than the neutral print (p < .001), and for anger video when compared to neutral video (p < 
.001). The sympathy print condition elicits greater sympathy than the neutral print (p < 
.05), as does the sympathy video when compared to the neutral video (p < .001).   
 These results support H1. Every condition except neutral print is more effective at 
eliciting the targeted emotions, demonstrating that news presentation format and the 
emotional tone of news content significantly shape emotional appraisals. Video formats 
are more emotionally provocative than print, and emotional frames consistently elicit 
greater emotion than neutral news. The greatest effect on emotion, however, occurs when 
the two types of emotional cues are paired, as the largest means are observed in the anger 
video and sympathy video conditions. These results show that information context plays 
an important causal role in shaping the emotional appraisals of news consumers. 
 Information context shapes emotional appraisals, but it is critical for my research 
to understand how sophistication interacts with that process. H2 posits that sophistication 
positively affects emotionality across conditions. Thus, the effect of sophistication in 
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different conditions (sophistication X emotion condition X media condition) must be 
examined. Table 4.2 shows logistic regression results for dummy variables indicating the 
experience of anger and sympathy toward illegal immigrants.
26
 Significant conditional 
effects of sophistication and both condition dummies are evident when the other 
constituent terms are centered at their means. Interactions aside, high sophisticates are 
more likely to experience both anger and sympathy toward illegal immigrants than low 
sophisticates. However, consistent with H1, the data also indicate a role for news format. 
Exposure to video news rather than print or news with a clear emotional slant rather than 
a balanced tone makes emotional appraisals more likely. The two-way interactions are 
weaker with the only significant relationship being the moderating effect of 
sophistication on new format for anger appraisals. 
The key result in Table 4.2, however, is the significant triple interaction of 
sophistication and the two experimental conditions. Thus, sophistication affects 
emotional appraisals, but its effect varies by condition. Figure 4.2 plots the predicted 
probabilities of feeling anger. The solid unmarked line in each box is the effect of 
sophistication in the control group. Different boxes compare the sophistication effect by 
media format or tone. Figure 4.3 shows the plots for sympathy appraisals. The pattern of 
results for both emotions is similar, so I limit my discussion to the anger plots. 
Figure 4.2 shows that across all five conditions the sophistication plots slope 
significantly upward, supporting H2 that sophistication is positively related to emotional 
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 Results are similar when the dependent variable is ordinal emotion intensity, so the findings are robust to 
changes in the dependent variable form. The dummy is analyzed for ease of presentation. Emotion 
frequency vary by condition (control: 34.5% angry, 17.9% sympathetic; balanced print: 38.7% angry, 
24.6% sympathetic; balanced video: 61% angry, 48.4% sympathetic; anger print: 66.9% angry; anger 
video: 87.7% angry; sympathy print: 45.8% sympathetic; sympathy video: 81.8% sympathetic). 
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Table 4.2:  Immigration Emotions with Sophistication and Media Interactions 

























































LR 144.04*** 128.87*** 
Pseudo-R
2
 .177 .165 
F (13, 560/559) 2.438** 2.051* 
N 591 590 
Note. Entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients; dependent variable is 
a dummy indicating that participant feels the emotion in question (0 = no emotion, 1 
= anger or sympathy toward illegal immigrants); interaction constituent terms were 
centered before making interaction terms; F indicates improvement in fit over the 
model with no interactions; +p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 Figure 4.2: Anger Predicted Probabilities, Sophistication Effect by Condition 
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 Figure 4.3: Sympathy Predicted Probabilities, Sophistication Effect by Condition 
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appraisals. Regardless of information context, high sophisticates are indeed more likely 
than low sophisticates to experience anger (and sympathy) toward illegal immigrants. In  
the control group, the lowest sophisticates at -2 SD only have a 13% chance of reporting 
anger, whereas the highest sophisticates at +2 SD have a 52.8% chance, a difference of 
39.8 percentage points. In the absence of stimuli, this is a powerful sophistication effect. 
 Comparing treatment conditions in Figure 4.2, however, shows that media format 
can substantially moderate the effect of sophistication on emotion, shifting the location of 
the entire probability plot and its steepness. Panel A contrasts neutral video and print 
formats within the control. Compared to the control, the neutral print condition is 
generally ineffective at eliciting greater anger, though the 95% confidence intervals (not 
shown) for the points at +2 SD on sophistication in these conditions do not overlap. Thus, 
only the highest sophisticates respond with greater anger to information in the neutral 
print context, leaving lesser sophisticates incapable of engaging emotionally with the 
stimulus. Every point on the neutral video plot, however, differs from its respective point 
on the neutral print and control plots, indicating emotional responsiveness across the 
sophistication spectrum is greater in this condition.  
A similar video format effect is seen in panel B where the two anger conditions 
are plotted. Again, every point on the anger video plot differs significantly from where 
similar sophisticates on the anger print and control plots are located. These results recall 
H1 that video formats elicit more emotion than print, an effect that is evident at every 
level of sophistication. The highest and the lowest sophisticates are better able to engage 
with news material presented in a video format and process it in a manner that facilitates 
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anger appraisals. This universal effect of video does not necessarily replicate in print, 
however, at least when print news is presented in a neutral tone.  
Panels C and D further support H1 as news with an emotional tone elicits greater 
emotion than either neutral news or the control. Again, this effect occurs across the 
sophistication spectrum. The entire anger print plot in panel C differs significantly from 
the neutral print and control. Whereas all but the most sophisticated participants were 
emotionally unresponsive to the neutral print prompt, the anger print condition elicits 
more anger at all sophistication levels. Print news, then, can be emotionally provocative, 
but only when that format has a clear emotional slant.  
Likewise, every point on the anger video plot differs significantly from the neutral 
video and control plots. The power of emotional cues to elicit feelings is most evident in 
the anger video condition where the two types of cues – audiovisual and tone – are 
paired. Low sophisticates at -2 SD on the sophistication factor score have a 75.6% chance 
of reporting anger as compared to 97.2% for participants at +2 SD, dramatic movement 
when compared to the control and other conditions with fewer cues. 
Thus, H1 and H2 receive substantial support in this analysis. Media formats that 
employ more emotional cues are more effective at eliciting emotion among participants 
across the sophistication spectrum, as evidenced in both the difference of means tests and 
the anger plots where entire probability curves shift significantly upward when additional 
cueing is added to the media treatments. The sole exception is neutral news in print, a 
format whose limited cueing fails to emotionally engage all but the most sophisticated 
respondents as compared to no stimulus at all. This result hints that print media do little 
to engage citizens of even average sophistication, let alone low sophisticates. 
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Sophistication, however positively affects the likelihood of emotional appraisals 
across conditions regardless of what cues are present. Absent any stimulus, high 
sophisticates are more emotional about immigration than low sophisticates, but that 
remains true in a low cue environment such as neutral print news and a high cue context 
that pairs video news with a clear emotional slant.  However, the difference in likelihood 
of appraisal between the highest and lowest sophisticates does shrink as media employ 
more cues. The steepest slopes are observed in the control and neutral print conditions, 
but the shallowest is seen in the anger video condition. It appears that additional cueing 
enables the appraisals of low sophisticates more than those of high sophisticates.  
This finding is intriguing only because it stands in contrast to the pattern observed 
in campaign advertising in Chapter 3 where low sophisticates were virtually unresponsive 
to large increases in advertising GRP. This could indicate a ceiling effect among high 
sophisticates. Perhaps they are already so capable of making appraisals that additional 
cues do little to aid them, but that would not explain the unresponsiveness of low 
sophisticates to campaign ads. Of course, it may simply be that campaign ads and news 
are so fundamentally different conceptualization of context that we should not reasonably 
expect to find the same emotional and behavioral patterns in both. 
This pattern among low sophisticates might also result from the intensity of 
emotion in the stories or the extended length of exposure in viewing three news reports 
back-to-back. Neither of these, two aspects of information context are captured in the 
GRP measures that just reflect number of (typically) 30-second exposures. A third 
explanation might be that this comparatively greater responsiveness is an artifact of the 
experimental method. To complete the experiment, participants must force themselves to 
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go through each webpage and at least satisfice their way through the survey, but even that 
minimum attention might amount to more attention than is normally devoted to 
advertising over the course of a campaign. The forced, artificial experiment might reveal 
what is actually a genuine response pattern, but it may not replicate to the real world 
because attention to stimuli such as campaign ads is not as fake and intentional. 
Uncovering the precise explanation for this result is beyond my scope in this experiment. 
 
Learning Effects 
Emotion also affects learning in ways that may be moderated by contextual and 
psychological factors. H3 posits that media formats with more emotional cues will 
stimulate greater learning. Video formats and media with clear emotional frames, then, 
should be more conducive to learning than print or news that is neutral in tone. To test H3 
I first conducted one-way ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests to evaluate the between-
subjects relationship for learning and experimental condition. I drop the control from 
analyses here as no stimulus was provided in that condition, so there was no information 
for participants to process and retain. The independent variable is a 7-point nominal item 
indicating experimental condition. The dependent variable is the 9-point learning scale.  
Figure 4.4 shows the mean of the learning scale by condition. The difference of 
means tests indicate a significant main effect of condition on learning [F (5, 705) = 28.92, 
p < .001; χ2 (5) = 62.221, p < .001]. The η2 for learning is .167, so the experimental 
treatment accounts for roughly 17% of the total variance in learning. Scheffe tests show 
significant differences within the three emotion groupings as the neutral (p < .001), anger 
(p < .05), and sympathy (p < .001) video conditions all induce more learning than their 
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print counterparts. Likewise, within media formats, the anger (p < .001) and sympathy 
print (p < .001) conditions both elicit significantly more learning than the neutral print 
stimulus, as do the anger (p < .001) and sympathy (p < .001) video conditions as 
compared to the neutral video group.  
These results support H3. Media that are richer in emotional cues, those with 
video formats or emotional frames, are more conducive to learning than less evocative 
media. Indeed, the greatest learning occurs in those conditions, the anger and sympathy 
video groups, which take advantage of both types of emotional cueing, whereas the least 
learning occurs in the neutral print group where participants are exposed to the least 
emotional cueing. On average, then, the manner in which information is presented 
significantly affects learning. 
If the interplay between sophistication and media format affects emotional 
appraisals, then it may also shape the learning that results from emotions. Formats with 
more emotional cues induce more learning than those with fewer cues, but H4 posits that, 
within these various conditions, sophistication and emotion interact so that learning 
effects are more pronounced among high sophisticates. The magnitude of that interaction, 
though, may vary depending upon emotional cueing. Thus, the quadruple interaction of 
sophistication, emotional experience, and the experimental conditions demands scrutiny 
(sophistication X anger/sympathy X emotion condition X media condition). 
 Table 4.3 shows poisson regression results for the learning count. A number of 
the lower-order effects are relevant to the hypotheses I test in this dissertation. The 
conditional effects of the interaction constituent terms show that each directly affects 
learning, albeit when the other terms are centered at their means, even though conditional 



























relationships exist. Sophistication, exposure to video news, and exposure to emotionally 
slanted news all independently stimulate learning, as hinted at in the tests of H3. Anger 
significantly depresses information retention, but sympathy enhances learning. The 
negative anger effect is consistent with Valentino et al. (2009), but little work suggests 
how sympathy might affect learning. Sympathy is a response to the suffering of others 
and elicits helping behavior to ameliorate that suffering (Haidt 2003). If sympathy 
promotes engaging others through behavior, it is reasonable that it also facilitates 
cognitive engagement though increased attention that leads to learning. 
The key results in Table 4.3 are the significant quadruple interactions of 
sophistication, emotion, and the two condition dummies. Sophistication moderates the 
effect of emotion on learning such that the learning of high sophisticates is more 
influenced by emotion action tendencies. Thus, angry high sophisticates learn less than 
angry low sophisticates, but sympathetic high sophisticates learn more than sympathetic 
low sophisticates. To the extent that emotions motivate either engagement or 
disengagement with information encountered, Table 4.3 suggests that that motivation is 
greater for high sophisticates. They may be more interested in issues such as illegal 
immigration than low sophisticates and naturally more attentive to them, so those 
characteristics may dovetail with the greater engagement that sympathy seems to produce 
to motivate greater learning among high sophisticates. On the other hand, angry high 
sophisticates may care more about immigration, be more certain of their immigration 
attitudes, and feel they already know a great deal about the issue, perhaps explaining why 
the disengagement anger induces is more pronounced for them.  
 
124 
Table 4.3: Learning Effects with Sophistication and Media Interactions 
 Anger Sympathy 
Anger -.158 (.059)**  
Sophistication .108 (.022)***  
Emotion Condition .204 (.057)***  
Media Condition .116 (.052)*  
Anger X Sophistication -.194 (.059)**  
Anger X Emotion .296 (.113)*  
Anger X Video  -.199 (.095)*  
Sophistication X Emotion -.075 (.043)+  
Sophistication X Video -.079 (.038)*  
Emotion X Media .021 (.075)  
Anger X Sophistication X Emotion  -.15 (.093)  
Anger X Sophistication X Video  -.227 (.089)*  
Anger X Emotion X Video  .266 (.71)**  
Sophistication X Emotion X Video -.155 (.076)*  
Anger X Sophistication X Emotion X Video -.314 (.131)*  
Sympathy  .134 (.042)** 
Sophistication  .225 (.021)*** 
Emotion Condition  .28 (.042)*** 
Media Condition  .163 (.041)*** 
Sympathy X Sophistication  .146 (.052)** 
Sympathy X Emotion  .099 (.099) 
Sympathy X Video  .021 (.075) 
Sophistication X Emotion  .121 (.048)* 
Sophistication X Video  .174 (.039)*** 
Emotion X Media  .282 (.076)*** 
Sympathy X Sophistication X Emotion  .278 (.076)*** 
Sympathy X Sophistication X Video  .172 (.088)* 
Sympathy X Emotion X Video  .261 (.169) 
Sophistication X Emotion X Video  .236 (.086)** 
Sympathy X Sophistication X Emotion X Video  .378 (.171)* 
Ideology -.005 (.011) -.006 (.012) 
Partisanship -.002 (.012) -.013 (.013) 
Economic Class -.043 (.024)+ -.046 (.025)+ 
Female -.024 (.044) -.011 (.043) 
White .117 (.057)* .021 (.057) 
Academic Year .061 (.02)** .044 (.019)* 
Constant 1.461 (.022)*** 1.535 (.028)*** 
LR 198.93*** 245.96*** 
Pseudo-R
2
 .146 .134 
F (21, 443/442) 1.689* 1.748* 
N 474 473 
Note. Entries are unstandardized poisson coefficients; dependent variable is a count of 
correct responses (0-9); interaction constituent terms are centered; F shows improvement 
in fit over the model with no interactions; +p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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For example, Figure 4.5 plots predicted learning for the interaction of the 
experimental conditions, sophistication and the experience of anger toward illegal 
immigrants. In each condition, sophistication positively affects learning among 
participants who do not feel angry. Non-angry high sophisticates, thus, learn more from 
the treatment than non-angry low sophisticates. The sophistication effect among the non-
angry mirrors Figure 4.5 in that learning is significantly higher at all points when 
comparing the two video conditions to their print counterparts, and when comparing the 
two anger conditions to the relevant neutral tone conditions. 
 Sophistication, however, negatively affects learning for angry participants across 
all conditions, but the learning plots show that the magnitude of that interaction is 
moderated by the emotional cues in media. In the neutral print condition, the least 
evocative context as it employs the fewest emotional cues, the learning curves for angry 
and non-angry participants only differ significantly among the highest sophisticates at +2 
SD. Thus, anger depresses attention enough to affect learning only among the most 
sophisticated participants in this low cue situation. As media become more emotionally 
stimulating, however, the anger effect is amplified as less sophisticated participants begin 
to differ significantly from their non-angry counterparts. In the neutral video condition, 
learning is significantly lower among angry participants at +1SD and higher, and among 
those scoring at and above the mean in the anger print condition. In the anger video 
condition where audiovisual and explicit emotional framing are combined learning is 
significantly lower for participants scoring -1 SD and higher, leaving only the lowest 
sophisticates at -2 SD unaffected. 
 Figure 4.5: Learning Effect of Anger and Sophistication Interaction by Condition 
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 Figure 4.6: Learning Effect of Sympathy and Sophistication Interaction by Condition 
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 Figure 4.6 shows predicted learning for sophistication and sympathy interacted 
with the experimental conditions. Again, sophistication and media format jointly  
moderate the effect of emotion on learning. Sophistication among unsympathetic 
participants positively affects learning, but feeling sympathy further promotes learning. 
The magnitude of the sympathy effect, like anger, is heavily influenced by emotional 
cues. Only the highest sophisticates at +2 SD in the neutral print condition learn 
significantly more than the unsympathetic. Those at +1 SD and higher in the neutral 
video condition exhibit significant learning increases, as do those at -1 SD and above in 
the anger print condition. The cue effect inverts in the sympathy video condition as 
participants scoring at the sophistication mean and below learn significantly more than 
the unsympathetic. High sophisticates here already score so highly on learning that it may 
be difficult for sympathy to focus their attention more than it already is on the stimuli. 
 The learning results support H4. For both anger and sympathy there is a powerful 
interaction between emotion and sophistication, but the magnitude of that interaction is 
moderated by the qualities of the media being consumed. Anger depresses attention to the 
stimuli, thereby decreasing learning. Sympathy, though, engages participants, drawing 
attention to the stories so that information encoding and recall is enhanced. These biases, 
however, are more pronounced among high sophisticates in almost every condition. 
Angry high sophisticates consistently learn less from the stimuli than angry low 
sophisticates, whereas sympathetic high sophisticates always learn more than sympathetic 
low sophisticates. In the least emotionally evocative contexts, however, emotion 
exclusively affects the learning of the highest sophisticates as compared to those who do 
not experience either anger or sympathy. As stimuli employ more emotional cues to 
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engage participants, the less sophisticated begin to respond to their emotions through 
their learning patterns. Overall, then, this study shows that individual psychology and the 
qualities of media interact to shape how citizens respond to political stimuli, both in 
terms of their emotional appraisals and how they process information. 
 
Discussion 
This experiment suggests that the psyche and the qualities of information contexts 
interact to shape emotional responsiveness to political stimuli. On the psychological 
front, this chapter offers solid evidence that political sophistication is key to the 
experience of emotion. High sophisticates are more likely to feel emotion in response to 
illegal immigration than low sophisticates, a pattern found both in the absence of any 
stimuli and after participants are exposed to immigration news employing various 
modalities and tones. High sophisticates are not only more emotional about politics, but 
also more susceptible to the learning biases of emotion. Participants who feel anger 
toward illegal immigrants experience depressed learning levels, but that effect is most 
pronounced among the most sophisticated students in the sample. Sympathy, on the other 
hand, facilitates learning with its effect usually strongest among the highest sophisticates.  
 The experiment also shows how information contexts moderate the effects of both 
sophistication and emotion. Media contexts with more emotional cues are more effective 
at eliciting emotion from participants in general, but the degree of responsiveness for 
high and low sophisticates differs. High sophisticates are always more likely to feel anger 
or sympathy, even in conditions with more cueing. Likewise, media with more cues 
promote more learning in general, but those cues moderate the magnitude of emotional 
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effects on learning. In low cue media, emotions tend to shape learning only among the 
most sophisticated participants, but, as media become more emotionally evocative by 
using more emotional cueing, less sophisticated participants begin to show those 
behavioral biases. Thus, all four hypotheses advanced here receive strong support. 
 This chapter further undermines the traditional view that emotion is a low 
sophistication phenomenon. This experiment reinforces the finding from previous 
chapters that high sophisticates, the most politically informed and engaged citizens, are 
actually more emotional about politics. High sophisticates report greater levels of 
emotion than low sophisticates in the absence of any stimuli, and continue to do so when 
prompted with emotionally compelling stories. Further, high sophisticates are more 
affected by the behavioral biases of emotion. These results shatter the stereotype of the 
unengaged and uninformed citizen who feels rather than thinks about politics, and whose 
behavior is driven by those feelings. Low sophisticates are certainly capable of making 
emotional appraisals about political stimuli, but they are less capable of doing so than 
their more sophisticated counterparts, and are less motivated to engage in behaviors that 
stem from emotional experiences. 
 This chapter is important in the larger picture of my dissertation because it is a 
randomized experiment from which I can draw some degree of causal inference. The 
positive relationship between sophistication and emotion consistently replicates in cross-
sectional contexts, but it is not possible to make explicit claims about causality from such 
data. The paradata in Chapter 2 treat the “one-shot” survey setting as an observable span 
of time in which I can analyze how respondent behavior in answering questions varies 
according to individual sophistication, but claiming causality from those patterns would 
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be a stretch. Chapter 3 goes a step further in using a quasi-experiment where the 
advertising treatment varies by media market. While providing stronger clues about 
causal processes, quasi-experimental settings still leave considerable room for 
confounding factors to influence the observed results. 
 The experiment reported in this chapter, however, takes advantage of random 
assignment to rule out potential confounds. It also allows me to control the stimuli 
participants see, something I obviously cannot do with campaign ads from a decade ago. 
My results here provide the strongest evidence yet that sophistication is not just related to 
greater emotionality about politics, but causing or enabling those emotions in the first 
place. In the control condition there is no stimulus at all, yet high sophisticates are still 
more likely to be emotional about illegal immigration absent any prompting. Even in the 
NES setting there is the year-long stimulus of the campaign to which respondents react. 
That responsiveness of high sophisticates, however, replicates and becomes more 
pronounced as participants are exposed to more emotionally evocative media. 
 Causality is critical for my theory as it helps allay the concern of endogeneity 
between sophistication and emotion. The central claim of affective intelligence (Marcus 
et al. 2000) is the emotion promotes information seeking behavior. In other words, 
emotions induce learning, thereby making people more politically sophisticated. Indeed, 
given my learning results in this chapter, I can take no issue with the affective 
intelligence argument, and I readily admitted in Chapter 1 that the relationship between 
emotion and cognition is non-recursive. I will further admit that my results bolster the 
affective intelligence claim about information seeking. Marcus and his colleagues never 
test the effect of emotion on any measure that approximates learning as I do here. Instead, 
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their analyses are normally limited to showing a relationship between emotion and 
attention to political campaigns. Thus, I specifically test the proposition that emotions 
make a more informed citizenry to which they allude but do not pursue. 
However, this experiment, especially the control where no information that might 
provoke emotion is provided, shows that sophistication itself is a pre-cursor to emotion.  
Absent any stimulus or prior priming of illegal immigration, high sophisticates are more 
likely to report being emotional about the issue. When more evocative stimuli are 
provided, sophistication again is a key predictor of emotional appraisals in this controlled 
setting, and one that conditions how participants learn as a consequence of their 
emotions. Thus, though I in no way contradict the affective intelligence theory, I do 
demonstrate that the relationship between emotion and the qualities that indicate 
sophistication is a complex two-way street. Does emotion cause sophistication? Yes. 
Does sophistication cause emotion? Yes. In the real world these phenomena influence 
each other rather than one being the preeminent cause of the other. 
 The effects of the experimental treatments also beg reconsideration of how we 
normatively evaluate political communication. Many scholars have lamented the decline 
of traditional news media, particularly the hard news style once so common in print and 
television newscasts of decades past (e.g. Bennett 2003; Cook 2005; Hamilton 2004; 
Jones 2009; Norris 2000; Patterson 1994). Part of their critique is that modern news 
emphasizes flashy audiovisuals and emotional frames at the expense of the quality of 
reporting. The fear of many critics is that citizens will learn less about politics and 
government from more modern media formats, creating a politically impoverished 
citizenry. Grabe and Bucy (2009) refer to this fear as “the pomp and circumstance of 
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print culture,” a relic of times past when literacy was a supposed hallmark of an 
intelligent, thoughtful, and rational citizenry. If consumers of media cannot me made to 
read hard, objective, fact-based newspapers on a daily basis, the next best thing may be 
for them to watch informative public affairs programming that is the closest 
approximation in the television world. Certainly, the logic goes, average citizens will 
learn little or nothing from “fluff infotainment.” 
This study, however, suggests that those critiques may be overblown at best or 
unfounded at worst. Participants universally learn more when media take advantage of 
emotional cues. Indeed, the most learning occurs when media most resemble the flashy 
soft news format commonly derided in modern scholarship, and the least learning occurs 
when news most resembles the traditional type of reporting that many scholars idealize. 
Perhaps, then, modern media trends may actually create a more informed electorate for 
the very reasons they are attacked. Relying on more audiovisual modalities and emotional 
framing may do as much to engage and inform consumers as it does to entertain them. 
Humans are under a constant barrage of sensory stimuli. The brain is always monitoring 
the environment for stimuli that may induce emotion if cognitive or behavioral adaptation 
is necessary. The brain, then, is expert at multitasking, and may respond best to 
information that stimulates it as much as possible. All things equal, average citizens may 
just be hardwired to learn about politics better from Katie Couric and “if it bleeds, it 
leads” journalism than they are the New York Times or the PBS NewsHour. 
 Many scholars have shown that emotions have important effects on mass political 
behavior, and this experiment shows how the psyche and the external information context 
interact to moderate those processes. There is, however, room to improve upon this study. 
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As with all student samples, the generalizability of these results is an open question, but 
public surveys rarely include the questions needed to replicate this study on a wider scale 
with a more representative sample. Also, context can be conceptualized in many ways. 
This experiment focuses solely on the news media, especially more traditional forms of 
communication such as print and television. It is reassuring that the general pattern of 
results reported here is similar to what was observed in the campaign advertising quasi-
experiment in Chapter 3, but different types of contexts may function fundamentally 
differently. Whether the results would replicate in discussion networks or even other 
types of media formats is a question for further study. Nevertheless, this research, despite 
any limitations, sheds important light on the causal dynamics of emotion and provides 
strong support for the hypotheses I advance in this dissertation. 




Ultimately, this dissertation asks us to reconsider how we think of the empirical and 
normative roles of emotion in politics. Beginning with the philosophers of Ancient 
Greece and Rome, theorists, social scientists, and popular political commentators have 
promulgated the idea that emotion is an undesirable contagion in the body politic. 
According to this view, emotion is wild and dangerous. It is the opposite of reason and, 
thus, irrational. It is a crutch that less informed and less engaged citizens rely upon rather 
than devoting the necessary effort to learn about politics and reason through political 
questions. In short, there is little desirable about emotion and humanity must strive to 
overcome or, at the very least, contain it. 
 Political science has begun to turn this negative view of emotion around, 
reframing emotion an important factor in political behavior and even a desirable element 
of democratic citizenship. My dissertation contributes to both of these arguments. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, most recent political science work on emotion deals with the 
direct effects of emotion on a variety of political behaviors. Thus, there is little doubt that 
emotions can powerfully influence voting, policy and political attitudes, learning, and 
myriad other behaviors. However, though it is invaluable, this literature gives little
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insight into how politics elicits emotion in the first place, and what factors might 
condition the behavioral effects of emotion. My dissertation begins to shed light on both 
those causal and conditional dynamics. 
 Throughout my dissertation I have argued that political sophistication enables 
individual emotional responsiveness to political stimuli. I have demonstrated and 
rigorously tested that relationship in cross-sectional data and have provided causal 
evidence from a randomized experiment that supports that theory. Thus, my central claim 
has held up quite robustly in multiple tests and in a variety of contexts. High political 
sophisticates are better at emotionally appraising politics than low sophisticates. They 
know more about politics, are more interested in it, and pay more attention to it. In sum, 
they understand political affairs better and are more engaged with the political world.  
 However, the causal side of emotion is about more than individual psychology. 
Citizens have the potential to tap into a wealth of political information that surrounds 
them at all times in different types of information contexts. Campaigns make themselves 
heard, but individuals can intentionally expose themselves to political information simply 
by turning on the television, opening the newspaper, or asking a friend about his or her 
view on the latest political story. Different contexts have different qualities, though. They 
vary in the amount of information available for consumption and the modalities they 
stimulate, as well as their familiarity, divisiveness, and myriad other factors.  
 I cannot operationalize context in all its forms in this one dissertation, nor can I 
tap into every possible quality that might vary across those contexts. Nevertheless, I have 
demonstrated that the qualities of two important political information contexts – 
campaign advertising and the traditional news media – moderate how sophistication 
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affects emotional appraisals. More emotionally evocative contexts are better at eliciting 
emotion in general and even certain behaviors such as learning. The emotions of high 
sophisticates are universally more responsive to political information in all its forms, but 
low sophisticates are better able to engage emotionally with some contexts than others. 
Thus, while sophistication and information context can shape emotional appraisals 
independent of one another, it is in their interaction that we can observe more powerful 
causal relationships that, indeed, more accurately reflect the reality of how citizens 
interact with their environments on a daily basis. 
 Though my dissertation pushes the boundaries of extant literature on emotion in 
politics by delving into questions of causality, it also encourages us to think harder about 
the effects of emotions. By and large scholars have been rightly concerned with 
uncovering the direct effects of emotion, but I have demonstrated in multiple analyses in 
my dissertation that political sophistication moderates the effect of emotion on behavior 
and attitudes. Contrary to the conventional academic and popular stereotype, it is not low 
sophisticates who are more prone to act on their emotions. Indeed, my analyses show that 
emotion often exerts little effect at all on the behaviors of the least engaged and informed 
citizens. Rather, it is high sophisticates, the citizens often idealized as the paragons of 
good democratic citizenship, who tend to act more on their emotions. Their feelings are 
stronger influences on the attitudes they express, the votes the cast, and how they learn 
from the information around them. High sophisticates understand better how to translate 
emotion into political action, and have the greater preexisting motivation and political 
interest to act upon their emotions.  
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 My results beg two important questions that stem from the traditional view of 
emotion. First, emotion has normally been seen as a detriment. From this point-of-view, 
it is a wild force that supposedly prevents the individual from engaging in the kind of 
rational thought and deliberation that characterize good citizenship. It needs taming so 
that education and careful reasoning can triumph. However, as my dissertation shows, if 
emotion is actually an outgrowth of knowledge about and engagement with the political 
world, is it really the undesirable element it has been painted to be? My results suggest 
that ignorance of and disinterest in political affairs do not breed emotional citizens. 
Rather, engagement and understanding promote not just thinking about politics, but 
feeling about it, as well. The emotional citizen is politically informed, engaged, 
interested, attentive, caring, and understanding – all the qualities that we normatively 
want citizens in a modern participatory democracy to possess. Individuals low in those 
qualities do not care enough or know enough about politics to feel much about it. 
Perhaps, then, emotions such as anger, fear, and hope are signs of the kind of engagement 
with politics that we value as a field. They are indicative of good, higher quality 
citizenship rather than a democracy of satisficers and dumbed-down sound bite politics. 
 Second, is emotional rational? Beginning with ancient scholars, Western culture 
has naturally paired the terms “emotion” and “irrational” both in and out of political 
contexts. The concerns that Marcus et al. (2000) document largely deal with philosophers 
who believed that passions take control of individuals and drive them to behaviors that 
are undesirable and counterproductive to society. Phrases such as “irrational anger,” 
“irrational exuberance,” and “get control of your emotions” are indicative of the 
sentiment that emotion is the opposite of reason and rationality. 
139 
 However, let us return to the core definition of what an emotion is – an appraisal 
that some object carries consequences for individual and group goals. If emotions occur 
because we feel that an object either threatens or enhances some goal or objective we 
desire, then the very definition of an emotion comports with the idea that rational 
behavior is goal-directed behavior. Emotion, then, depends on the ability to link stimuli 
to objectives, the consequence being that emotion promotes goal-seeking behavior. If the 
aggregation of fear is George W. Bush‟s reelection or the sum of hope is Barack Obama, 
perhaps these outcomes are the result of rational behavior stemming from some level of 
sophisticated thought. After all, it is high sophisticates who better understand politics 
and, presumably, their political desires who vote more on these emotions. Again, we 
must rethink how we stereotype emotion and begin to find a place for it in frameworks of 
rational action and behavior. 
 Overall, my dissertation has provided strong support for each hypothesis I have 
advanced in this research. High sophisticates are not only more emotional about politics, 
but more responsive to political stimuli and more prone to acting upon their feelings. This 
is not to say that low sophisticates are incapable of reacting emotionally to the political 
world. Rather, less informed and engaged citizens are simply less likely to be emotional 
about political affairs because they take do not understand politics as well and care less 
about it. When they do feel about politics, they are not as motivated as high sophisticates 
to act on those emotions, and, in some cases, may not understand how best to translate 
those feelings into action. As a result of this research, I would hope that interested 
scholars would also begin to rethink their assumptions about emotion, and push research 
in this area in other innovative and informative directions. 
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Appendix A 
Iraq War Web Survey Questions 
 
Sophistication Items 
1. Some people don‟t pay much attention to politics, and some people do. In general, 
how much attention do you pay to politics? (1 = none at all, 4 = a lot) 
2. Some people aren‟t very interested in politics, and some people are. In general, 
how interested are you in politics? (1 = none at all, 3 = very much) 
3. What job or political office does Harry Reid now hold? 
4. What job or political office does Condoleezza Rice now hold? 
5. If no one running for president receives a majority of electoral votes, who 
becomes responsible for choosing the President? 
6. The Supreme Court has the power to declare laws unconstitutional. What is this 
power called? 




1. How often has the Iraq War made you feel angry toward the US/ angry toward the 
Iraqis/ guilty about the actions of the US/ sympathetic toward the Iraqis? (0 = 
never, 4 = very often) 
 
Iraq Blame 
1. In your opinion, who is responsible for the problems in Iraq? (1 = The Iraqis 
themselves are entirely to blame, 3 = The Iraqis and the US are equally to blame, 
5 = The US is entirely to blame) 
 
Iraq Policy Items 
1. The US should increase financial aid to Iraq for humanitarian needs such as food, 
medicine, and shelter. (1 = agree strongly,  5 = disagree strongly) 
2. The US should increase financial aid to Iraq to repair damage to infrastructure 
like roads and bridges caused by the US invasion. 
3. The US should keep its troops in Iraq until the country is stable and secure 
enough to take care of itself. 
4. The US should send more troops to Iraq to fight the militia and terrorist 
organizations responsible for violence there. 
 
Controls 
1. What is your academic year? (1 = freshman, 4 = senior) 
2. What is your gender? 
3. What term best describes your race?  
4. Which of the following best describes your religious preference? 
5. Are you presently a member of the military? 
6. What term best describes your political party affiliation? (1 = strong Democrat, 7 
= strong Republican) 
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7. One way that people talk about politics in America is in terms of conservative, 
moderate, and liberal. Where would you place yourself on this scale? (1 = very 














































Media Markets Tracked by CMAG in 2000 
 
Market Code Market Code 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy 1 Miami-Ft. Lauderdale 39 
Albuquerque-Santa Fe 2 Milwaukee 40 
Atlanta 3 Minneapolis-St. Paul 41 
Austin 4 Mobile-Pensacola 42 
Baltimore 5 Nashville 43 
Birmingham-Anniston-Tuscaloosa 6 New Orleans 44 
Boston-Manchester 7 New York City 45 
Buffalo 8 Norfolk-Portsmouth-Newport News 46 
Charleston-Huntington 9 Oklahoma City 47 
Charlotte 10 Omaha 48 
Chicago 11 Orlando-Daytona Beach-Melbourne 49 
Cincinnati 12 Philadelphia 50 
Cleveland-Akron-Canton 13 Phoenix-Prescott 51 
Columbus 14 Pittsburgh 52 
Dallas-Ft. Worth 15 Portland-Auburn 53 
Dayton 16 Portland, OR 54 
Denver 17 Providence-New Bedford 55 
Des Moines-Ames 18 Raleigh-Durham-Fayetteville 56 
Detroit 19 Richmond-Petersburg 57 
Flint-Saginaw-Bay City 20 Roanoke-Lynchburg 58 
Fresno-Visalia 21 Rochester 59 
Grand Rapids-Kalamazoo-Battle Creek 22 Sacramento-Stockton-Modesto 60 
Green Bay-Appleton 23 Salt Lake City 61 
Greensboro-High Pt.-Winston Salem 24 San Antonio 62 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Asheville 25 San Diego 63 
Harrisburg-Lancaster-Lebanon-York 26 San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose 64 
Hartford-New Haven 27 Seattle-Tacoma 65 
Houston 28 Spokane 66 
Indianapolis 29 St. Louis 67 
Jacksonville-Brunswick 30 Syracuse 68 
Kansas City 31 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Sarasota 69 
Knoxville 32 Toledo 70 
Las Vegas 33 Tulsa 71 
Lexington 34 Washington, DC-Hagerstown 72 
Little Rock-Pine Bluff 35 West Palm Beach-Ft. Pierce 73 
Los Angeles 36 Wichita-Hutchinson 74 
Louisville 37 Wilkes-Barre-Scranton 75 
Memphis 38   
 Appendix C 






Determine whether an emotional appeal is present in the ad. Use the emotion definitions as a guideline for determining whether an 
appeal pertains to a certain emotion or not. If an appeal exists anywhere in the ad, place a “1” in the box that matches that emotion to 
the candidate who is the target of the appeal. Code all other appeals “0” for not being present in the storyboard. 
 
Emotion Bush McCain Bradley Gore 
Anger     
Contempt     
Disgust     
Disappointment     
Excitement     
Fear     
Gratitude     
Hope     
Pride     
Resentment     
Shame     





 Appendix D 
Demographic Controls, Tables 3.3 – 3.5 
 
Table 3.3 
 Bush Gore 




























































































































































































 Appendix E 
Demographic Controls, Tables 3.6 – 3.8 
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Experiment Question Wording 
 
Sophistication Items 
1. Some people don‟t pay much attention to politics, and some people do. In general, 
how much attention do you pay to politics? (1 = none at all, 4 = a lot) 
2. Some people aren‟t very interested in politics, and some people are. In general, 
how interested are you in politics? (1 = none at all, 3 = very much) 
3. What job or political office does Harry Reid now hold? 
4. What job or political office does Ben Bernanke now hold? 
5. If no one running for president receives a majority of electoral votes, who 
becomes responsible for choosing the President? 
6. The Supreme Court has the power to declare laws unconstitutional. What is this 
power called? 
7. Who was the first woman nominated for Vice President by a major political 
party? 
 
Illegal Immigration Emotions 
1. Does the illegal immigration situation make you feel (emotion)? If so, how 
(emotion) do you feel? (0 = no, 4 = extremely) 
 
Learning Items: Neutral Conditions (C = Closed-Ended, O = Open-Ended) 
1. How many illegal immigrants of Hispanic origin are estimated to live in North 
Carolina? (C) 
2. What percentage of the Duplin County population is Hispanic? (O) 
3. How many temporary worker visas does the United States government issue each 
year? (O) 
4. What was the main problem facing the UCSD burn center? (C) 
5. What is UCSD planning to do to get paid for treating the illegal burn victims? (O) 
6. Under what conditions do hospitals have to treat uninsured patients? (C) 
7. What agency conducted the immigration raid in Houston? (O) 
8. How did law enforcement find out that Action Rags USA might be employing 
illegal immigrants? (O) 
9. What did the family member of a suspected illegal immigrant say as a defense for 
the arrested workers? (C) 
 
Learning Items: Anger Conditions (C = Closed-Ended, O = Open-Ended) 
1. What government agency took custody of the two illegal immigrants accused of 
murdering Dani Countryman? (C) 
2. How long had the two illegal immigrants accused of murdering Dani Countryman 
been in the United States? (C) 
3. What is an immigration detainer? (O) 
4. How many Utah children are estimated to be victims of Social Security theft by 
illegal immigrants each year? (C) 
5. What benefits do illegal immigrants get from having fake Social Security cards? 
(O) 
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6. How much does a fake Social Security card cost on average? (O) 
7. What do you call a location in the desert where illegal immigrants wait for human 
smugglers to pick them up? (C) 
8. Why doesn‟t Arizona clean up the litter and pollution caused by illegal 
immigrants in the Arizona desert? (O) 
9. What threat do abandoned vehicles pose to the desert ecosystem? (C) 
 
Learning Items: Sympathy Conditions (C = Closed-Ended, O = Open-Ended) 
1. What government agency seized Anna Herrera‟s mother and aunt? (C) 
2. What is the name of the organization that Anna Herrera‟s teachers and friends 
started? (C) 
3. What is the purpose of the organization that Anna Herrera‟s teachers and friends 
started? (O) 
4. What has the decrease in employment been for illegal immigrants in Los Angeles 
as a result of the current recession? (C) 
5. In what way has the current recession mainly affected the countries that illegal 
immigrants come from? (C) 
6. Why don‟t some illegal immigrants like Manuel Barajas go home rather than stay 
in the United States with little change of finding work? (O) 
7. Why has the New York City Police Department‟s hate crimes unit become 
involved in the murder of the illegal immigrant in New York City? (O) 
8. How much is the case reward for information leading to the arrest of the men who 
murdered the illegal immigrant in New York City? (O) 




1. What is your academic year? (1 = freshman, 4 = senior) 
2. What is your gender? 
3. What term best describes your race?  
4. What term best describes your immediate family‟s economic status (1 = working 
class, 5 = upper class)? 
5. What term best describes your political party affiliation? (1 = strong Democrat, 7 
= strong Republican) 
6. One way that people talk about politics in America is in terms of conservative, 
moderate, and liberal. Where would you place yourself on this scale? (1 = very 












Neutral Story #1 
 
By Dave Jordan 
Staff Writer 
Wilmington Morning Star 
Thursday, March 26, 2009 
 
 The challenges of illegal immigration are a concern for communities across North 
Carolina as the Hispanic population in the state surges. The US Census estimates 600,000 
to 700,000 Hispanics are in North Carolina, and 300,000 to 400,000 are illegal. As we 
continue our investigation on illegal immigration, we take you to one county here in 
Eastern Carolina that has the highest percentage of Hispanics in the state, and based on 
the state numbers and research by the Pew Hispanic Center, half are likely illegal.  
 
Alejandro Mendez came to the United States from Mexico twenty year ago as a migrant 
worker looking for economic freedom. “We had to start looking for something else, like, 
you know, to make a good life for my family, for everybody,” Mendez said. Today, he‟s 
a US citizen and owns a restaurant in Warsaw in Duplin County. “I feel pretty good 
because, you know, we got a lot of benefits for the Mexican citizens,” he continued. 
 
Mendez is part of the changing face of Duplin County, the kind of ground zero in the 
surge of Hispanic immigrants, both legal and illegal. US Census figures show 20% of the 
population in Duplin County is Hispanic, the highest in the state.  The state average is 
around 7%.  
 
And the increase in Warsaw is evident with the new businesses popping up. Jason Burrell 
is the Warsaw town manager. “We‟ve had a good track record with the Hispanic 
businesses that have come here. They seem to flourish and they seem to do well,” Burrell 
stated. 
 
Research shows in North Carolina, Hispanics both legal and illegal make quite an 
economic contribution, about $9 billion a year. Other research shows any revenue is 
offset by the costs of paying for services for those who are undocumented. And that‟s 
what has people in towns like Warsaw and so many others concerned about their 
communities. “We do see it changing. Sometimes it‟s not for the better,” said Pearl West, 
a Warsaw resident. 
 
Win Batton is the Warsaw mayor. “Many of them are certainly making a contribution in 
providing needed workforce, but, at the same time, if they‟re here illegally, uhh, in many 
cases they‟re not paying taxes other than what they have to pay on the food they buy,” he 
said.  
 
Alejandro says everyone who works in his restaurant is legal. He makes sure of it with 
proper paperwork. “We have to ask them for the social security. To pull it up on the 
computer,” he explained. And it‟s that kind of business Warsaw officials say they want 
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more of. “We want people that are legal. If they‟re not legal, we want them to go back, 
and get their status straight, and c‟mon back and be a good productive citizen. Uhh, that 
way we can all benefit,” Mayor Batton said. The town has even held workshops for 
people who may not be here legally, showing them how to correct the situation.  
 
Anita Villeda of Beaufort County, whose boyfriend is illegal, says the 300,000 to 
400,000 undocumented workers in the state are needed. “Mexicans are hard workers, and 
everybody knows that,” she said. “They work for the tobacco, and, you know, in the 
fields in the hot weather. What other people won‟t do.” And in the process, some say, 
keep costs down for many products, goods, and services Americans use. Others contend 
the undocumented workers keep wages down, and that‟s why US citizens don‟t want the 
jobs.  
 
They‟re all issues being felt in this historic town of Warsaw, over 150 years old, now 
dealing with the growing pains of a new population explosion, and the challenges of 
illegal immigration.” I think that it‟s something they have to work to fix, you know. The 
system needs to be fixed,” Mendez said. One of the fixes employers are seeking is more 
foreign temporary worker visas. That would allow people to legally enter the United 
States to work, but not stay here permanently. Right now the United States gives out 





























Neutral Story #2 
 
By Ed Lenderman 
Staff Writer 
San Diego Union Tribune 
Thursday, March 26, 2009 
 
The story of local wildfires doesn‟t just involve the firefighting and the property 
destruction. Of the 18 people lying in the University of California at San Diego (UCSD) 
medical center‟s burn unit today, 11 are illegal immigrants with no apparent health 
coverage.  
 
The raging Harris Fire started along the border, so it was perhaps inevitable that among 
the burn victims would be illegal immigrants.  Fifteen illegal immigrants in all have been 
victims of the fire, and 4 were found dead. The 11 injured are in UCSD medical center‟s 
acclaimed burn unit. Four are in critical condition.  
 
“Here at UCSD we‟re the only regional burn unit in San Diego,” explained Dr. Tom 
McAfee, physician-in-chief at UCSD. “We always look for ways to get reimbursed for 
the care we provide. And for patients that are undocumented, they often will not qualify 
for the usual programs, the usual safety net programs, that the county provides, or that the 
state provides through the MediCal program. So in many cases these patients won‟t have 
any sponsorship, and we won‟t recover any of the costs of the care we‟re providing.” 
 
Because of the severity of the injuries of the 11 illegals, the medical center is looking at a 
potential loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars. “Our philosophy here and the law is 
that a patient who comes through our doors and has an acute medical problem, we treat 
those patients without regard to the color of their skin, their religion, or their ability to 
pay,” Dr. McAfee stated. “And we will continue to care for patients in our hospital until 
they are ready to be discharged or transferred to another facility.”  
 
But therein lies another cost issue. The nature of severe burns virtually requires long term 
care, months and perhaps years of treatment. “What often happens for us is that when a 
patient has reached a point where they really don‟t require acute hospitalization, but they 
could be transferred to either a rehabilitation facility or a skilled nursing facility, our 
experience is that those facilities won‟t accept those patients because, like us, they 
require reimbursement to keep their doors open,” Dr. McAfee said. You would think the 
state and local governments would chip in here, but Dr. McAfee says that certainly hasn‟t 
been the case in the past. That doesn‟t mean UCSD isn‟t going to try this time around, 
and that includes seeking reimbursement from the government of Mexico.  
 
“So we will be pursuing getting reimbursement through the Mexican government,” Dr. 
McAfee stated. “We‟ll be going to the federal authorities. I‟ll be in Washington, D.C., on 
Monday meeting with our congressman and you can be sure I‟ll be talking about this 
issue, as well.”  
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Appendix I 
Neutral Story #3 
 
By Ford Atkinson 
Staff Writer 
Houston Chronicle 
Thursday, March 26, 2009 
 
Immigration officers carried out a raid at an export business in southeast Houston this 
morning. They say they were working on a tip that illegal immigrants were employed at 
Action Rags USA.  
 
It was a very, very strange morning at the clothing plant. It wasn‟t what people 
anticipated. But after a huge immigration raid, business was brought to a halt. Federal 
immigration agents began raiding a clothing rag exporting plant about 7 o‟clock this 
morning.  
 
Immigration officials said the raid came after a year-long investigation into reports that 
Action Rags USA employed illegal immigrants. “What you need to understand is that 
work site enforcement, particularly investigations involving work site enforcement are 
phased in approach,” explained Agent Greg Palmore, an Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) spokesman. “It takes various steps to get to the prosecution stage.”  
 
By early morning vans transported the immigrants away from the plant. As the raid 
progressed, family members of the suspected illegals arrived hoping to find out where 
their relatives would be taken. Family members we talked with thought the raid was 
unjustified. “They ain‟t really doing nothing bad, you know. They‟re working, you 
know,” said Luis Patio, a nephew of a suspected illegal immigrant. “They ain‟t hurting no 
one, you know. They‟re here to make money.” At least one of the detained workers was 
released to her family after proving she was a legal resident.  
 
Investigation of Action Rags USA is not over. “What will happen here is we‟ll collect as 
much information as we can, and follow the information where it takes us,” Agent 
Palmore stated. Officials have not yet said exactly how many immigrants they have taken 
into custody in the raid. We presume from observing the scene that it may be in the 
dozens, but those numbers cannot be confirmed. We also don‟t know what countries they 












Anger Story #1 
 
By Anna Songh 
Staff Writer 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 
Thursday, March 26, 2009 
 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials have confirmed that two men 
accused of murdering a teenage girl in Milwaukee are in the United States illegally. ICE 
released a statement this morning saying that two cousins accused of the murder have 
admitted to authorities they illegally crossed into the US from Mexico six months ago. 
 
A spokeswoman for ICE tells us Alejandro Rivera Gamboa and Gilberto Ariano Gamboa 
are both on ICE detainers. That means whenever their criminal case wraps up, whether or 
not they are convicted, they would immediately be put in the custody of immigration 
officials and begin the deportation process. However, that process, which can take a few 
months, does not begin until after the criminal case concludes. The cousins were 
arraigned yesterday.  
 
It‟s been just over a week now since 15-year-old Dani Countryman died. Meanwhile we 
are learning about some of the evidence authorities are using to connect these two men to 
the crime. According to court documents, a bloody shoe print on Dani‟s chest matched a 
shoe belonging to one of the suspects, Alejandro Rivera Gamboa. Also in the document, 
Alejandro told detectives his cousin, Gilberto Ariano Gamboa, was lying on top of Dani 
when she screamed for help, so Alejandro stepped on her throat until she stopped 
moving.  
 
Dani‟s family praised the police for their work and says these men deserve the toughest 
punishment. “I‟m for the death penalty and, uhh, as far as I‟m concerned, that‟s what 
should happen to them,” said Carl Barton, Dani‟s great-uncle. “You know, they‟ve taken 
her life, and why should they be alive?”  
 
The two suspects reportedly met Dani at a party the night before she died. Witnesses say 
they gave her beer and were grabbing Dani and other women inappropriately. Prior to 
this morning‟s confirmation from immigration officials, we only knew the men were on 
ICE holds, which does not automatically mean they are in the US illegally. The 
spokeswoman said that can mean that someone has a green card, but has committed a 
crime and is being investigated for deportation. But, again, these two men apparently 









Anger Story #2 
 
By Robert Walz 
Staff Writer 
Salt Lake Tribune 
Thursday, March 26, 2009 
 
An illegal immigrant might have your child‟s social security number right now and is 
using it to get a job in the United States, and maybe even obtain credit cards. That‟s 
rather frightening to think about. 
 
The Utah Attorney General plans to start sending letters out to parents to let them know 
that someone may have stolen their child‟s identity.  The letters will tell parents how to 
find out if someone is using their child‟s number and why kids are the most likely targets 
for social security identity theft.  
 
Children receive a social security card at birth, but don‟t usually use it until they get a 
job. But according to Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, kids and thousands of others 
in the State of Utah are the victims of an underground social security scam that puts their 
identifications into the hands of illegal immigrants. “The numbers are pretty staggering,” 
Shurtleff said. “There are a lot of social security numbers out there of people in this state 
that have been compromised by someone.”  
 
The high number of illegal immigrants coming into Utah helped created a lucrative 
underground counterfeiting business where crooks can sale a fake social security card for 
$150 each. “It‟s hard to catch them,” Shurtleff explained. “They move around a lot. As 
soon as you get some information on them, they move. There are more of them than you 
probably think.”  
 
Adults usually find out about the identity theft because it shows up on their credit reports, 
but most people never think about their kids‟ accounts until they grow up and get a job. 
“The worst time to find out about that is when they‟re 18. They go to get a car loan. They 
go to get student loans. They go to do something important, and then they find out that 
their credit history is wrecked,” Attorney General Shurtleff said.  
 
Investigators don‟t know exactly how many illegal immigrants are currently using the 
social security numbers of Utah children. The number could exceed 20,000, according to 
estimates, though. You can check out your social security account and your child‟s 
account by going to the Social Security Administration webpage. If you fill in your 
information, a printed report of any activity about the number will come in the mail in 
about four weeks.  
 
In some cases an illegal immigrant had used a child‟s social security number for years 
without anyone knowing. “It‟s the gateway to everything that one needs to establish 
themselves in this country,” Shurtleff said. The attorney general‟s office plans to send out 
154 
100 copies of this letter to parents in the state of Utah this week. They anticipate they‟ll 















































Anger Story #3 
 
By Rebecca Thomas 
Staff Writer 
Arizona Republic 
Thursday, March 26, 2009 
 
Though we hear a lot about illegal immigration, rarely do we hear about how it affects 
the environment. Human smugglers and illegal immigrants, though, are turning the 
southern Arizona desert into a wasteland.  
 
The vast Sonora desert looks serene and clean, until you look closer. “There are 
thousands of these lay up spots, all across southern Arizona,” border patrol agent Mike 
Scioli explained. These sites are the result of human smuggling. Foot guides lead 
immigrants from the border to lay up sites in the southern Arizona dessert. “What they‟ll 
do is they‟ll either wait for another foot guide to take them further north, or they‟re 
waiting for vehicles to pick them up to carry them into the city of Phoenix.”  
 
While they wait, illegal immigrants litter. Empty water bottles, plastic jugs, aluminum 
cans, shoes, clothes, you name it. “The dessert looks harsh. It looks tough, but in fact it‟s 
pretty delicate. And there are a lot of creatures that live out there,” said environmentalist 
Rob Smith of the Sierra Club. Smith explained that animals can eat or get caught in 
plastic bags which can be deadly. Smugglers abandon vehicles that can contaminate the 
soil and groundwater if it leaks oil or other fluids. Plastic bottles and aluminum cans 
aren‟t biodegradable, so they can stick around for decades.  
 
We visited one particular lay up site about 25 minutes southeast of Chandler. At this time 
there isn‟t legislation in place to clean these areas up. The dirty work is left to concerned 
citizens who volunteer.  
 
“This is part of the much larger problem of immigration reform which ultimately needs 
Congress to act on, or this is just one more symptom,” said Republican State 
Representative Ward Nichols. He has seen the devastation from these lay up sites first 
hand in the wildlife refuges along the border. “It was one of the most shocking things 
I‟ve ever seen.” 
 
Nichols says right now the state doesn‟t have the money to clean up lay up sites, and it 
won‟t until the border is secure and foot traffic has stopped. “I believe at that point we 
can say, ok, we‟re going to get in and we‟re going to actively clean these areas up,” 
Representative Nichols stated. “We‟re going to actively continue to patrol them, and let 
the environment come back. Let the wildlife come back in the area.” Until then, lay up 






Sympathy Story #1 
 
By Phil Hamilton 
Staff Writer 
Los Angeles Times 
Thursday, March 26, 2009 
 
Like most days, Anne Herrera comes straight home after school. But instead of hanging 
out with friends and doing typical teen things, these days she‟s doing the cooking, paying 
the bills, helping her younger cousins with their homework, and then going to work 
herself. That‟s because Anna‟s mother and aunt were taken away by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents in the middle of the night last week for being 
undocumented immigrants. 
 
“I was so used to coming home from work, or just from school, or just from anywhere, 
and going into my mom‟s room and telling her I‟m here, or giving her a goodnight kiss,” 
Annie cried. “And it‟s hard to know that she‟s no longer in her room.”  
 
Anna says even with her grandmother trying to help out, all of the children are having a 
hard time. “It‟s been hard for me concentrating on work because sometimes I think about 
my mom, and how she might be doing over there. Sad without us being there with her.”  
 
Anna‟s mother and aunt are being held at a detention center in Los Angeles. In the 
meantime, her teachers and classmates have been trying to help raise money to hire an 
attorney. “My teacher, you know, opened an account, and we started a small organization 
called the United Family Fund,” Anna said. “And we‟re raising money just to help 
children whose parents have been taken away to pay for, umm, legal help.”  
 
Anna knows many people won‟t have sympathy for her family‟s ordeal, seeing the issue 
as simple as you‟re legal or illegal. “No, it‟s not that simple,” she stated. “I mean, I might 
not understand about politics or everything that‟s going on, but it‟s not that simple. There 
are families who are being split up. Little kids are being left without their parents, 
without their moms.”  
 
She is devastated that her mother will not see her graduate high school in three weeks, 
something she had always dreamed of. “She did so much and she worked so hard, and it 
is very, very, very hard. And, you know, I‟m so proud of my mom, and I know I want her 
to be proud of me.” One of Anna‟s teachers set up a bank account through Washington 









Sympathy Story #2 
 
By Thelma Guiterrez 
Staff Writer 
Los Angeles Times 
Thursday, March 26, 2009 
  
On the corner of a busy Los Angeles intersection, day laborers gather and wait for work. 
Manuel Barajas arrived at 6 AM. So did Pedro Pablo, and about 100 others. Nine hours 
later they are still waiting.  
 
Manuel, who says he‟s in the country illegally, says he‟s desperate because he was two 
small children to feed in Mexico City, rent to pay here, and he hasn‟t worked more than 
three days in the last year. His brother helps to support him. He says he wants to go 
home, but can‟t even afford a ticket.  
 
When asked if they‟re having similar problems, the men at the day laborer center all raise 
their hands. Jeronimo Salguero, director of the day laborer center, says employment has 
fallen off by as much as 75% this past year. “They come to the office and say, „Jeronimo, 
please help me. I want to go back to my country.‟”  
 
Pedro Pablo, also undocumented, is one of them. He says he‟s out of money and can‟t 
even afford rent, which is $117 a month. He took us to his one bedroom apartment that he 
shares with seven other workers. They sleep on the floor in the barren and unfurnished 
apartment, but each of them has their space. Pablo sleeps in the corner next to the coat 
closet with no pillow or blanket, but he does have a picture of his family. Pablo says he 
supports a wife and five sons in Guatemala, but he hasn‟t been able to send any money 
home for four months. And that weighs heavily on him.  
 
Professor Abel Valenzuela of the University of California at Los Angles explains, 
“You‟re seeing fewer immigrants from all over the world who are here in the United 
States sending fewer resources back home, right from where they come from. This can 
have a really, really big impact on those countries that are most vulnerable economically 
speaking.”  
 
Pablo has decided to leave. The Guatemalan consulate gave him a one way bus ticket 
home. He takes with him a duffel bag, and an unfulfilled dream to make it in America. 
Until then, he goes back to the corner to wait for work. He says when he returns to his 









Sympathy Story #3 
 
By Chris Jones 
Staff Writer 
New York Times 
Thursday, March 26, 2009 
 
Authorities in New York are out looking for three people they say launched a vicious 
attack on an Ecuadorian immigrant on a street corner in Brooklyn, leaving him braindead. 
The 31-year-old victim was walking with his brother early Sunday morning, when 
witnesses and the police say the assailants began shouting anti-gay and anti-Hispanic 
slurs, then beat him with a baseball bat.  
 
Local leaders quickly denounced the murder. “Let us stand together and let us denounce 
in no uncertain terms these acts of violence,” the Reverend Herb Daughtry said in a 
statement. Police in New York are investigating the case as a homicide, and have also 
gotten the city‟s hate crimes task force involved.  
 
Authorities haven‟t named any suspects, and are asking for help in locating a livery cab 
driver. Fernando Mateo of Hispanics Across America released a statement, saying, “We 
believe that he has information that could help the police department in solving this 
issue.” The police are also offering a $22,000 reward for any information leading to the 
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